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Abstract
In this thesis, we examine the relationship between passive ownership in the Norwegian
stock market and the liquidity and price efficiency of the underlying stocks. We suggest
that a shift from active to passive investing should be associated with a decrease in the
liquidity of individual stocks, as more shares are held in long-term deposits and more
trading is executed on a non-fundamental basis. The same shift, in addition to a reduction
in liquidity and an increase in the trading of stocks in large baskets, should all lead to a
decrease in the price efficiency of the underlying stocks.
In our analysis, we utilise a panel of 214 publicly listed Norwegian stocks in the period from
2000 to 2020, with monthly ownership and daily financial market data on the stock-level.
We find a negative relationship between changes in the passive ownership of a stock and
contemporaneous changes in its liquidity. The effect is smaller for larger stocks, which
could explain why we find a larger effect than the existing literature using our sample
of relatively illiquid Norwegian stocks. Further, we document a negative relationship
between changes in passive ownership and changes in price efficiency, as measured by
return synchronicity. We find that the effect is smaller for larger firms. Taking into
account our sample of relatively small firms, the effect is still small relative to the existing
literature. This could be explained by the frequent trading of stocks in baskets by ETFs,
which is less prevalent in the Norwegian market.
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1 Introduction
During the last few months, the debate on active versus passive asset management has
again raged in the Norwegian financial press. On the one hand, there is little doubt
that the emergence of the passive investment style has improved the welfare of many
individuals, by allowing for inexpensive access to what has been advocated as more or
less optimal portfolios. However, commentators often fail to take into account the role
of the active investor as a facilitator for the passive. Specifically, through their own
self-interest, active investors provide liquidity at what they perceive as reasonable price
levels, thus affecting both the liquidity and the price efficiency in the market. In our
thesis, we examine the impact of the shift from active to passive on these two elements of
the market microstructure in Norway.
In 2000, index funds and passive ETFs held about 5% of the U.S. equity market. Today,
they hold 19%. In Norway, the numbers are 0.5% and 5%, respectively. During our 21.5
year sample, U.S. stocks have experienced an average net flow from passive funds of about
$440 million every single trading day. Norwegian stocks, on the other hand, has received
net flows from passive funds of $2.4 million a day1 during the same period. Since the 2008
financial crisis — when passive investing in Norway really started to escalate — average
net flows have been $3.5 million a day.
When examining the possible impacts of this massive increase, the existing literature
mainly focuses on three traits of indexers: (1) the passive holdings of shares over long
periods of time, (2) the absence of fundamental analysis and (3) the trading of stocks in
large baskets.
Prior literature shows that these traits could influence several aspects of the stock market.
More specifically, Israeli et al. (2017) show that there is a positive relationship between
ETF ownership and trading costs. Due to the migration of uninformed investors to ETFs,
they also find a negative relationship between ETF ownership and price efficiency. These
findings correspond well with those of Hamm (2014), Sammon (2020) and Zou (2019).
Further, Ben-David et al. (2018) document a positive relationship between the underlying
1
None of the figures for the Norwegian equity market include The Government Pension Fund Norway
(Folketrygdfondet), which we will discuss in detail later.
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stock’s ETF ownership and volatility, due to a strong arbitrage channel between ETFs and
their underlying assets. Da and Shive (2018) claim that increases in ETF ownership lead
to an increase in return comovement in stock markets. This relationship is also emphasised
by Sullivan and Xiong (2012), who also document an increase in non-diversifiable risk
from increases in passive investing.
We examine the impact of passive strategies on the liquidity and price efficiency of
Norwegian stocks. We posit that the long-term passive holdings of stocks lead to lower
liquidity, as more shares are kept away from trading. This could again negatively affect
price informativeness, as higher trading costs induce less trading by informed investors. In
addition to this, an increase in the trading of stocks in large baskets could also negatively
affect the firm-specific information embedded in prices.
We approach the issue empirically. We focus on the increase in passive investing during
the last two decades and use ownership data on the stock-level to examine the impacts
of passive inflows on various liquidity and price efficiency metrics. We use the effects
discovered in the U.S. market as guidelines for our analyses. The result is a holistic review
of the mechanisms through which passive investing might have affected price efficiency in
the Norwegian market, partly through its influence on liquidity. This market is different
from the American, in that passive investing is both less prevalent and more comprised of
traditional buy-and-hold index funds than exchange-traded funds. In addition to this, the
average free float share in Norwegian stocks is among the lowest in the western world,
and about half of that in the U.S., which could make the liquidity in the market relatively
sensitive to increases in long-term passive holdings.
Specifically, our hypotheses are stated as follows:
H1: “Does passive investing lead to reduced liquidity in the Norwegian stock
market?”
and
H2: “Does passive investing lead to less informative prices in the Norwegian
stock market?”
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In examining the first hypothesis, we use a similar approach as Israeli et al. (2017) in
applying two proxies for liquidity: the price impact of trading and the relative spread.
First, on the stock-level, we analyse the relationship between changes in the passive
ownership of a stock and its liquidity through correlational analyses. Second, we use
OSEBX inclusions as quasi-exogenous shocks in passive ownership, in order to establish a
causal relationship using a difference-in-differences approach. In addressing the hypothesis,
we apply the same methodology to four proxies of price efficiency.
We find that annual increases in passive ownership are significantly connected to decreases
in liquidity. The interpretation is the same using both proxies and is consistent with
our expectations and the findings of Israeli et al. (2017). The estimated relationship is,
however, larger in the Norwegian market, which could be a result of the differences in
the average level of free float and the differences in the types of passive vehicles analysed.
Using a limited set of OSEBX inclusions, we are not able to establish a causal relationship
for any of our liquidity proxies.
As for price informativeness, the results are more ambiguous. Using the event-based proxies
of Sammon (2020), the relationship between passive ownership and price informativeness
is only statistically significant for one out of the three proxies. Nevertheless, using the
return synchronicity proxy of Roll (1988) and Durnev et al. (2003), we find a significant
and positive relationship, indicating that the firm-specific information component in prices
is negatively associated with changes in passive ownership.
We structure the thesis in the following way. In the next chapter, we will provide
background information on passive investing, the ways in which it could influence markets
and the existing literature on the topic. The third chapter contains a description of the
data, variables and methodology used in the analyses. In the fourth chapter, we present
and discuss the findings of our analyses. The fifth chapter contains our conclusions, as
well as potential limitations with our analyses and suggestions for future research.
4
2 Theory
In the following chapter, we provide the relevant background for this thesis. We first
review a few key traits of passive investing and the case for choosing to invest in such a
strategy. Further, we examine the trend in passive investing during the last two decades,
before outlining the theoretical background for the link between passive investing and
our dependent variables. Lastly, we motivate our hypotheses on the basis of the existing
literature on this topic.
2.1 Passive Investing
We classify as passive any strategy that aims to track a predefined market-weighted index
of some sort. This includes the strategies of traditional index funds and index ETFs, but
not those that are normally considered in the middle of the passive-active continuum,
such as smart-beta and factor strategies. We acknowledge that we fail to account for
a great deal of undisclosed or privately managed passive investing. In addition to the
funds deemed appropriate by the abovementioned criteria, we include The Government
Pension Fund Norway (“Folketrygdfondet” or “FTF”) as a passive fund in our analyses.
We motivate this choice in Section 2.1.3. In the three following sections, we elaborate on
the three different types of passive vehicles in our analyses. Figure 2.1 illustrates their
distribution in size over the last 20 years.
2.1.1 Index Mutual Funds
The index fund was first introduced by Renshaw and Feldstein (1960). Most mutual
funds at the time failed to outperform broad indices (Jensen, 1964), and the authors
proposed that instead of attempting to identify high-performing funds, investors should
aim for the average return of the stocks in the index. They also pointed out that such a
strategy would require little analysis, thus adding economic value for investors through
the reduction of fees. The idea was debated throughout the 1960s. In the following decade,
Burton Malkiel’s work on the random walk and efficient markets hypotheses further fueled
the debate, as Malkiel in his book “A Random Walk Down Wall Street” argued that the
returns of active funds are in nature mean-reverting, implying that no single investor is
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able to consistently outperform the market. Consequently, any investor would be better
off investing in the passive, index-replicating mutual fund (Malkiel, 1973). Following these
arguments, the late John Bogle introduced the first index fund available to retail investors
in 1976. Today, this fund is known as the Vanguard 500 Index Fund and is the world’s
largest mutual fund with a net asset value (NAV) of about $620 billion Vanguard (2020b).
The theoretical idea of the index fund was, and still is, very simple. The fund aims to track
the performance of an index, with minimal tracking error. This is achieved by holding a
representative basket of the index constituents. In other words, an index fund operating
in a frictionless world should always own shares in all the assets that make up the index
it tracks. The individual holdings are weighted in the same manner as the index, which is
usually by market capitalisation (MCap) with an adjustment factor for free float. Index
fund managers only trade when the fund experiences inflows or outflows, when stocks
are included or excluded from the index, or in response to SEOs, M&As, buybacks and
dividends. The manager pays no attention to the fundamentals of the index constituents
and does not intervene in any way to optimize risk or return beyond what is embedded
in the index. In theory — as the efficient market hypothesis states that all information
about a financial asset is reflected in its price (Fama, 1970) — the fund always transacts
at the correct price. Along these lines, one could argue that the index fund “free rides”
on the analysis conducted by active investors. This absence of competitive stock-level
analysis is what allows index funds to charge low fees, relative to those of active managers
(PwC Asset Management, 2017).
In reality, there are a few additional aspects of index investing worth considering. First,
there is a trade-off between transaction costs and the number of individual stocks held
when minimising tracking error. Index fund managers incur transaction costs when
trading, and these costs are larger for less liquid stocks, which often are the same stocks
in which the index is underweight. Consequently, the expected tracking error depends on
aspects such as the size of the fund, the number of index constituents, and the liquidity
of these constituents. This is evident through the strategy of global index funds in the
Norwegian market. Through ten constituents, Norway represents about 0.18% of the
global equity index2 (MSCI, 2020). Therefore, most global index funds only hold between
two and ten Norwegian stocks, as any deeper diversification is deemed sub-optimal for
2
MSCI World Index as of 01.09.2020.
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such a small part of the overall portfolio. However, as both index technology and scale
has improved, transaction costs have decreased, and index investing is today viewed as
the most cost-efficient way to gain broad exposure to equity markets. This is one of
the reasons why the prevalence of passive investing have increased dramatically over the
course of the last 20 years. Today, John Bogle’s Vanguard manages about $6.2 trillion of
passive funds in total, or about 7% of the global stock market (Vanguard, 2020a).
2.1.2 Exchange-Traded Index Funds
Most of the existing literature on the effects of passive investing is conducted on index
ETFs. We treat index ETFs and index mutual funds the same way in our analyses. About
98% of ETFs are in fact passive in the sense that they follow an index with market
capitalisation weighting (Zou, 2019). There is not much that separates index ETFs from
traditional index funds in terms of investment strategy. Despite this, there is one key
difference, which is important in order to understand how ETFs might affect the market
for individual stocks and why such a large part of the research on passive investing is
focused on ETFs.
Similar to open-ended mutual funds, the number of shares of an ETF varies as the fund
experiences inflows or redemptions. A key difference is that holders of an ETF share can
trade this share in a secondary market throughout the day. In fact, ETFs are tradeable in
the secondary market in the same way as a stock, providing investors with the options to
go long or short and to use limit orders and stop-loss orders. Additionally, authorised
participants (APs) have the ability to both create and redeem shares of the ETF with
the ETF provider at the NAV of the underlying portfolio. This opens up an arbitrage
channel, as APs can profit if the ETF price deviates from the NAV. As APs also can
trade in the secondary market, the same mechanism will apply here. The result of this
arbitrage mechanism is very high liquidity at prices close to the NAV, at any given time
of the day. On the contrary, with traditional open-ended mutual funds, investors can only
purchase or redeem shares with the fund provider at the end-of-day NAV.
This opens up a new way in which the fund market and the stock market interact. With
mutual funds, the belief has been that only the transactions generated to facilitate inflows
and outflows could influence the stock market. With ETFs, on the other hand, there
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is a strong arbitrage channel requiring that movement in ETF prices must be equalled
with a similar movement in the underlying stocks, within seconds. The relationship
works in both directions. As ETFs have become increasingly popular for trading on
broad macroeconomic events, it is evident that volatility in ETFs will, to some extent,
propagate to the underlying securities. More specific, to the extent that ETFs attract
non-fundamental demand — that is, demand that would disappear had ETFs not existed
— ETF ownership will result in non-fundamental volatility for individual stocks due to
this arbitrage channel (Ben-David et al., 2018).
In the U.S., ETFs account for 17% of all fund holdings, while the same number in Norway
is 8%3. The ETF arbitrage channel is the basis for many of the academic contributions
we will present in the following, and the prevalence of ETFs could therefore be important
when comparing the effects of passive investing in Norway to those in the U.S.
2.1.3 Folketrygdfondet
The Government Pension Fund Norway, or Folketrygdfondet (FTF), is one of two
Norwegian state pension funds, and must not be mistaken for the larger Government
Pension Fund Global (“The Oil Fund”). FTF has a total assets under management (AUM)
of $13.44 billion invested in Norwegian equities but is not passive in the sense that it seeks
to minimise tracking error. Instead, FTF’s mandate, which is issued by the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance, states that the fund shall seek to achieve the highest possible return
in the long term. The mandate also states that the annualised volatility of the fund
relative to the OSEBX should not exceed three percentage points and that its ownership
in any single stock should not exceed 15 per cent (Mandat for Statens pensjonsfond Norge
– SPN, 2010). The fund claims to be active in the sense that it seeks to achieve excess
returns relative to the index. However, as the fund has grown larger, there seems to
be limited room for manoeuvring an active strategy in the Norwegian market, due to
transaction costs and the 15 per cent ownership restriction. On the other hand, a strict
index strategy would also incur substantial transaction costs every time the index is
rebalanced (Johnsen, 2011). Therefore, the fund executes its active strategy through the
long-term holding of most index constituents, with a few strategic deviations. This way,
3
By including Folketrygdfondet, ETFs account for 6.5% of all fund holdings as of June 2020.
4
Assets under management as of 30.06.2020.
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FTF operates similarly to index funds in that they "remove" shares from regular trading
when investing in a stock. This is equivalent to a more or less temporary reduction in
the free float. The fund’s deviations from the index are not crucial for our analysis, but
the long-term perspective is. That being said, it is important to emphasise that there are
no flows neither in nor out of the FTF. This means that the fund transacts only when
reallocating capital between stocks or between asset classes. As we analyse changes in
passive ownership, FTF is not necessarily as important for our analyses as Figure 2.1
indicates. Nevertheless, the fund contributes to our data as they have fewer but larger
transactions, while index funds and ETFs tend to have more but smaller transactions.
We expect the impact of the FTF to be similar to that of index funds and index ETFs.
This the first reason why we include FTF in our analyses. The second reason is the size
of the fund. FTF holds about 6% of all listed stocks in Norway, which is about the same
as index funds and ETFs combined. This means that by ignoring the fund, we would to
some extent overstate the impact of index funds and ETFs.
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Figure 2.1: AUM Distribution for U.S. and Norwegian Passive
Funds
This chart illustrates the distribution between the main types of passive investment
vehicles, based on their share of the total passive ownership in U.S. and
Norwegian stocks. The ownership data is aggregated by each individual fund
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2.2 The Case for Passive Investing
With the introduction of the passive investment style came also the debate on the right
to life for active and passive managers. In this section, we briefly present what we believe
to be the most important contributions to this debate.
William Sharpe stated, in his article “The Arithmetic of Active Management”, that:
“If active and passive management styles are defined in sensible ways, it must be the case
that (1) before costs, the return on the average actively managed dollar will equal the
return on the average passively managed dollar and (2) after costs, the return on the
average actively managed dollar will be less than the return on the average passively
managed dollar.” (Sharpe, 1991)
To arrive at this conclusion, Sharpe assumes that all passive investors hold some fraction of
the market, with each asset weighted relative to its weight in the market. Active investors
are defined as “one who is not passive”. Consequently, active investors must in aggregate
hold a portfolio identical to that of passive investors. Using simple arithmetics, Sharpe
proves the first of his two assertions. Passive investors will, individually and in aggregate,
achieve the same return as the market. Active investors must therefore also in aggregate,
though not individually, achieve the return of the market. Second, assuming that active
managers must charge higher fees, passive managers must achieve a higher return net of
fees. Since it was published in 1991, Sharpe’s arithmetic has often been utilised as a type
of “proof” of why passive management is the sensible choice for most investors.
Some 27 years later, Lasse Pedersen of AQR5 challenged Sharpe’s “Arithmetic”, or at
least the public interpretation of it. Pedersen outlines a number of scenarios in which he
believes that Sharpe (1991) deviates from reality. Sharpe examines a single period where
passive managers “start out” with a fraction of the market, hence do not trade at all.
Pedersen argues that the absence of trading is unrealistic, as any passive vehicle tracking
a market capitalisation-weighted index would have to rebalance its holdings as securities
come in and out of the index, for instance in the case of index additions and exclusions,
IPOs, M&As, SEOs, buybacks and dividend payouts. In such instances, passive managers
would have to initiate trades with an active counterpart, inevitably incurring some form
5
AQR Capital is an active asset management firm.
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of transaction costs. The perhaps most important flaw of Sharpe’s theory is the idea of
investing in “the market”. In reality, the market is an index, for instance the S&P 500
consisting of some 500 stocks. Sharpe’s arithmetic would not hold if active managers were
allowed to trade stocks outside the index, which in most cases, they are. Pedersen argues
that based on these mechanisms, active managers could very well outperform passive
managers over time. (Pedersen, 2018)
A different argument for indexed or «basket» investing relates to the positive skew of
individual stock returns. While this skew has been recognised in several academic
contributions (Albuquerque, 2012; Bessembinder, 2018; Fama and French, 2018),
Bessembinder et al. (2019) examine the practical implications for equity investors. They
find that only 3.8% of U.S. stocks outperformed the S&P 500 during the course of their
lifetime. Strikingly, the top-performing 1.3% of stocks accounted for the entire global
stock market’s wealth creation in the period from 1990 to 2018. In order for an investor to
capture the positive return of the aggregate market, it then becomes obvious that he/she
must own a few of these top performers. However, assuming no comparative advantage
over other investors, the investor can not identify these in advance. This ultimately means
that the only way to achieve this is through an index strategy. This is because a randomly
(assuming no competitive advantage) selected portfolio from the index will, in most cases,
underperform the index itself, when the median stock’s return is lower than that of the
index. In their master’s thesis, Norang and Agustsson (2018) use a 1985-2017 sample and
concludes that the same highly positive skew is present in the Norwegian stock market.
2.3 The Magnitude of Passive Investing
The total magnitude of passive strategies in equity markets is difficult to estimate. In
our analyses, we include as passive all index mutual funds and index ETFs, as well as
Folketrygdfondet.
Evident from Figure 2.2, the increase in popularity for passive strategies during the last
20 years has been remarkable, especially in the period after the GFC. The U.S. market is
the world-leader in indexed equity products, with about half of all fund assets in passive









Figure 2.2: AUM and Flows for Passive Funds in U.S. and Norwegian Stocks
These charts illustrate the total assets under management and the total cumulative net flow for passive and active funds
in the U.S. and Norwegian markets during our sample period. The leftmost charts (blue) illustrate the U.S. market, while
the charts to the right (red) illustrate the Norwegian market. The flows are cumulative aggregates of each individual fund























































2.3 The Magnitude of Passive Investing 13
2.3.1 Index Funds, Index ETFs and Folketrygdfondet
In the period from January 2000 to June 2020, the U.S. equity holdings of index funds and
index ETFs increased from 17% to 41% of total fund U.S. equity holdings, while increasing
from 3% to 24% in Norwegian equities during the same period, excluding Folketrygdfondet.
Relative to the total value of the stock market, index funds and ETFs now hold about
20% in the U.S. and 5% in Norway. By including Folketrygdfondet as a passive fund, they
hold a total of 9% of the Norwegian market. The net flows into U.S. stocks from passive
investing is equivalent to daily average inflows of about $440 million every trading day in
the abovementioned period. During the same period, active managers have experienced
net outflows of about the same magnitude. In Norway, while active managers have not
experienced net flows in any direction during the last 10 years, passive managers have
seen inflows of about $10 billion in the same period (or $4.1 million per trading day).
One key difference between passive investments in the U.S. and in Norway, is the
distribution between the different types of passive vehicles. As illustrated in Figure
2.1, ETFs now constitute about 40% of passive holdings in the U.S., while less than
20% in Norway. As ETFs are used by investors for shorter horizons than index mutual
funds, this means that passive vehicles in the U.S. market trade more frequently than
in Norway. On the contrary, passive strategies in Norway are more tilted towards the
long-term buy-and-hold strategy. This is relevant, as we believe that both the passive
holdings of shares over long periods of time and the frequent trading of large baskets of
stocks could influence the price efficiency of the underlying stocks. Sullivan and Xiong
(2012) argue that the trading of index mutual funds and index ETFs is visible through
the dispersion of volume changes between stocks. Stocks that are subject to passive funds’
basket trading experience similar daily volume changes, as passive trading is uniformly
a buy or sell order across stocks. In Figure 2.3, we replicate Sullivan and Xiong on our
Norwegian sample and illustrate a potential link between the rise in passive investing, and
a simultaneous decrease in volume change dispersion possibly caused by an increase in
the trading of stocks in large baskets.
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Figure 2.3: Dispersion of Volume Changes
This chart illustrates the equally-weighted dispersion of volume changes and the passive
ownership share from 2000 to 2020 in the Norwegian equity market. In line with
Sullivan and Xiong (2012), we calculate the dispersion of volume changes by taking
the natural logarithm of the weekly trading volume divided by that in the previous
week. The dispersion of volume changes in a given week is the standard deviation
of these observations across all firms. Each annual observation is the average of the
respective year, the prior year and the next year. Passive ownership is defined as the total
market capitalisation held by passive funds, divided by the total market capitalisation
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2.3.2 Implicitly Passive
In addition to index mutual funds, ETFs and the FTF, there are other significant passive
actors in the market, which we briefly account for in this section.
In 2017, index mutual funds and ETFs’ AUM were estimated at about 20% and 23%
of global passive AUM, respectively (BlackRock, 2017). The remaining 57% of passive
capital were made up of so-called “institutional indexers” and “internal indexers”, such
as sovereign wealth funds, family offices and insurance providers. Both the degree of
passiveness of such vehicles and the size of their assets, are ambiguous and to great extents
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undisclosed. Consequently, we refrain from analysing this portion of the market.
Next, the passive share of active vehicles is not accounted for, not even in Blackrock’s
2017 report. This part of the market is hard to quantify, mainly because the degree of
passiveness is ambiguous. On the one hand, the “active share”6 of active Norwegian funds
was stable at around 45% from 2007 to 2016, resulting in a 12-month rolling tracking
error of about 5% in the period. Based on these figures, almost half of Norwegian active
funds are classified as potential “closet indexers” (Thoresen and Øren, 2017). On the other
hand, the passive share of an active manager is not the same as traditional index funds’
holdings. While an active manager also holds a representative portion of the index — and
probably for the same reasons as an index fund does — he or she is not bound by a rigid
mandate and has the choice to adjust or abandon this strategy if the market, for instance,
is deemed overpriced or volatile.
2.4 Passive Investing and Liquidity
To understand why an increase in a stock’s passive ownership could lead to a decrease in
its liquidity, we must examine how and on what basis active and passive investors trade
in the market.
As predicted by Glosten (1994), electronic limit order books have neglected the role of
the traditional dealer in stock markets and it is evident that the new liquidity providers
are traders themselves. After the introduction of electronic markets, traders can position
themselves in the order book and provide liquidity at different price levels using limit
orders. In theory, active investors are therefore liquidity providers, as they have a notion
of when an asset is overpriced or underpriced and are willing to provide liquidity at these
levels. On the contrary, a passive strategy does not involve such notions. Passive investors
only trade in relation to index rebalancing or to facilitate inflows and outflows. While they
do attempt to minimise transaction costs, the most important objective when trading is
to gain exposure rapidly after an inflow, and conversely after an outflow. Consequently,
passive investors utilise market orders or similar types of trading algorithms, as the price
at which they transact does not matter to the same extent. This way, passive investors
can be viewed as liquidity demanders, as opposed to active investors (Hachmeister, 2007).
6
Active share as calculated by Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
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An additional trait of passive investors is that their holdings often have a more long-term
perspective than those of active investors, meaning that they trade more seldom. While
holding about 20% of the U.S. stock market, index mandates only account for about 5%
of the trading (Rowley et al., 2018). This might very well be a superior strategy, but it
implies that an increase in the passive ownership is analogous to a decrease in the free
float of a stock, which is documented to have a negative impact on liquidity (Chan et al.,
2004; Ding et al., 2016).
Another way in which funds could affect the liquidity of the underlying securities is
through lending out shares, for instance to facilitate demand for short-selling or hedging.
Evans et al. (2017) find that active funds, as opposed to passive funds, lose from lending
out shares. Further, Massa et al. (2015) document extensive lending activity by passive
funds, sometimes even outweighing their operational costs7. Sørmo (2016) finds that the
lending out of shares is positively associated with liquidity, which means that a shift from
active to passive investing could also have positive impacts on liquidity.
2.5 How and Why Prices Become Efficient
In order to establish a connection between passive investing and price efficiency, we rely
on the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model.
The model builds on a few basic assumptions. First, all prices are made up of two
components, where both are random variables, but one is observable by acquiring
information at some cost. The other is unobservable for all traders, implying that
no amount of information can lead to complete control. Second, traders in the model can
either choose to expend resources to become informed or stay uninformed. By acquiring
information at some cost, informed traders will have an edge over uninformed ones and
will therefore be able to earn a profit by trading with uninformed traders. Through the
trading on information, prices become more informationally efficient. The price efficiency
of a stock therefore depends on the number of traders choosing to become informed.
Based on these assumptions, the authors famously claim that prices can not be fully
7
As of 31.12.2019, KLP had NOK 4.8 billion worth of stocks lent out, equivalent to about 2.5% of their
total stock holdings. At the same time, FTF had lent out about 7.8% of their total stock holdings.
These figures are based on their annual reports.
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efficient, because if this was the case there would be no profits from trading, and therefore
no incentive for anyone to become informed nor to trade. Instead, they claim that prices
are efficient to the extent that traders are motivated to gather information, and to trade
on the basis of this. For traders to be motivated — that is, to choose to incur costs to
become informed — the returns that they can generate in the market must at least be
equal to the costs incurred to become informed.
If too many traders expend resources to become informed, then the compensation would be
small relative to the costs, as there would be few uninformed traders left. This would lead
to a migration back from informed to uninformed traders over time, and price efficiency
would decrease back to its equilibrium level. On the contrary, if too few traders choose to
become informed, prices would become so inefficient that the compensation would exceed
the costs, and more traders would choose to become informed. Thus, the equilibrium is
one where prices are “efficiently inefficient” to not drift too far away from efficiency.
Using this model, there are several ways in which prices could become more (less) efficient.
The first and most obvious one is that more (less) informed traders will lead to more (less)
efficient prices. However, other factors, like the quality of information or transaction costs
in the market, would affect the choice of investors to become informed or not, and thus
indirectly also affect price efficiency.
There are two ways in which passive investing could influence this equilibrium. First,
uninformed investors are likely the ones switching from trading the underlying securities
to an index strategy, as their losses to informed investors are limited when investing
in such vehicles (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1993). This leads to a decrease in the returns
and an increase in the costs of trading on information, which both lead to a decrease in
price informativeness. Second, and more indirectly, the possible increase in trading costs
outlined in the previous section is equivalent to an increase in the cost of information,
and is also expected to lead to a decrease in price efficiency.
2.6 Literature Review
The prevalence of passive strategies has increased substantially since the global financial
crisis, both in the U.S. and Norwegian equity markets. In line with these developments,
academics and professionals ask themselves what implications this might have for the
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microstructure of markets. In the following, we present a few of the ways in which passive
strategies are believed to affect the market, and the research that has been published
touching on this topic. We emphasise that a few of the aspects are intertwined, but we
will nevertheless review the contributions individually.
2.6.1 Index Inclusion Effects
In academic research, the most popular subject in terms of index strategies’ effects on
markets has been index inclusion effects. Consider for instance the inclusion of the Tesla
stock in the S&P 500, which will be effective at the 21st of December 2020. Roughly 4.6
trillion passive dollars track the index (Dans, 2020), which Tesla will constitute around
1.7%8 of. Evidently, the inclusion has initiated a $77 billion buying pressure in the stock,
as passive funds are obliged to hold 16% of the stock’s free float immediately after inclusion.
This will inevitably affect both the liquidity and the price of the Tesla stock.
An index inclusion effect in the S&P 500 was first discovered by Andrei Shleifer (1986).
On average, stocks included in the S&P have risen about 8.8% around the inclusion date.
The effect on excluded stocks is stronger, averaging at -15.1% (Petajisto, 2011). Naturally,
as passive managers have become aware of this, they have attempted to anticipate possible
index inclusions ahead of the announcement, and trade on this information if their mandate
allows for it. For instance, KLP — Norway’s largest index manager — utilises such a
strategy and claims for it to be a source of outperformance over time (Embu, 2020).
Despite this, using fund performance data from 2010-2014, Nesse and Aasen (2015) found
no consistent outperformance by Norwegian nor U.S. index funds. Such strategies are
referred to as enhanced indexing strategies, and could be the reason why Scari (2016)
found no link between the increase in the passive share of the market and an increase in
index inclusion effects. Instead, Scari found that the index inclusion effect for the S&P 500
index peaked in the late 1990s. An interesting hypothesis is that the reason for this peak
was all the new technology firms with a high founder ownership, i.e., low float-to-market
capitalisation ratio. In the late 1990s, indices were not float-adjusted, meaning that the
amount of passive investments were solely based on market capitalisation. Considering
two otherwise identical stocks, one would expect prices of the low free float stock to rise
8
Calculated based on TSLA market capitalisation and free float as of close 15.12.2020, retrieved from
Yahoo Finance.
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more from index inclusion than that of the high free float stock. Today, most indices,
including the OSEBX and S&P 500, are market capitalisation weighted with adjustments
through a float factor, ultimately reducing the cost of replication for passive vehicles.
We emphasise that while our thesis is not a study of index inclusion effects, our analyses
examine a few of the same mechanisms. However, we measure the impact of passive
ownership, and index membership is only relevant in deciding which stocks that receive
the inflows of passive investors. We control for index inclusion effects in our causality
analyses in Chapter 4.
2.6.2 The Impact of Passive Investing
The idea of an impact of passive strategies on stock market dynamics apart from the effects
at index inclusions, is a relatively recent one. The pioneers of the index fund largely relied
on the notion that inefficiencies would be countered by active investors and arbitrageurs,
ultimately limiting the impact of passive vehicles on the market. Nevertheless, as the
prevalence of passive investing has increased, some researchers argue that this notion is
no longer valid.
Hamm (2014) finds that ETF ownership is positively associated with the adverse selection
costs of trading. This is due to the migration of uninformed traders from the stock
market to the ETF market, which results in a decrease in liquidity for individual stocks.
Israeli et al. (2017) posit that through this decrease in liquidity, ETF ownership could also
negatively affect the price efficiency of individual stocks. They find significant relationships
supporting this proposition using data on U.S. stocks. Sammon (2020) investigates the
same effect using novel measures of price informativeness based on the market’s reactions
to announcements of firm-specific information. His findings largely correspond to those of
Israeli et al. (2017). Glosten et al. (2016) also investigate the effect of ETFs ownership on
the price informativeness of underlying securities but find that ETF ownership is positively
related to price informativeness. The reason for the opposing views lays in the research
design. While Israeli et al. (2017) use lagged changes in ETF ownership, Glosten et al.
(2016) consider contemporaneous changes. The interpretation of these conclusions could
be that while an ETF trade is initiated on the basis of information, the long-term effect
of increased passive holdings is a decrease in informational efficiency.
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Zou (2019) considers the directionality of the pricing effects of ETF ownership. Instead of
merely concluding that prices could become inefficient, she finds a positive link between
ETF flows and valuations in the long-term. This view is supported by Wurgler (2010). The
hedge fund Logica Capital Partners has expressed similar concerns regarding valuations.
While critics of this view claim that mispricing would be countered by active managers,
Logica points to the fact that the average cash holdings of active mutual funds is about
5% (Yan, 2006), while passive funds’ level is closer to 0.5% (Embu, 2020). Considering a
universe of one active and one passive manager, and cash and equity as the only option
for the two funds, it becomes evident that a shift from active to passive must drive equity
prices upwards (Logica Capital Partners, 2020). The specific effect of this becomes a
question of the elasticities and price impact of inflows.
Another line of research conducted on the effect of passive ownership focuses on the
increasing comovement of index constituents. Not to be mistaken for research related
to index inclusion effects, Sullivan and Xiong (2012) examine the comovement of S&P
stocks and link its increase to the increase in passive strategies. Specifically, they find a
strong increase in the pairwise correlation between index constituents, and also seemingly
clear signs of indexed trading by considering the dispersion of volume changes among
stocks. This measure is almost a perfect inverse of the trend in passive ownership, similar
to Figure 2.3. Da and Shive (2018) use stock-level data and arrive at the same conclusion
that index investing is associated with increased comovement. They claim that ETFs is
the most important reason for such observations, as it has become easier for investors to
trade on macroeconomic events using ETFs. This trading must propagate to individual
stocks. To the extent that the ETFs attract non-fundamental flows, this comovement is a
sign of less informative prices. On the contrary, Madhavan and Morillo (2018) claim that
the rise in cross-stock correlations is not connected to ETF flows, but rather an increased
investor emphasis on the macroeconomic environment.
The last effect of passive investing we consider in this review is the one on volatility. As
opposed to those on liquidity, price informativeness and volume, this effect is almost solely
attributed to ETFs, and not so much regular mutual funds. Ben-David et al. (2018) argue
that demand shocks in the ETF market propagate to the underlying securities, due to
arbitrageurs trading whenever the ETF price deviates from the NAV. The idea is that
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noise traders choose ETFs over trading the underlying securities, due to reduced costs
and the fact that there are less informed traders present. Given that the trading in ETFs
does not reflect firm-specific information, the arbitrage channel leads to non-fundamental
volatility in the underlying securities. This is similar to the arguments of Da and Shive
(2018) in relation to comovement. Ben-David et al. (2018) find a significant and causal
positive relationship between ETF ownership and volatility in their 2000-2012 sample of
U.S. stocks.
2.7 Motivation
We add to the literature by examining the effects of passive investing on both liquidity
and price efficiency in the peculiar Norwegian market. Our analyses on liquidity are
similar to those of Israeli et al. (2017) and Hamm (2014), however, we expand the existing
literature through our focus on all observable forms of passive investing, and not just
ETFs. Further, as opposed to Israeli et al. (2017), we use contemporaneous changes and
apply a quasi-experiment setting when analysing the possible link between liquidity and
price efficiency.
The U.S. market differs from the Norwegian in three important ways. First, passive
investing in total is larger in the U.S., with Norway lagging about ten years behind.
Second, a significantly larger share of passive holdings is invested with ETFs in the U.S.
Lastly, Norwegian stocks have among the lowest free float ratios in the western world.
The difference in the prevalence of passive investing does not necessarily produce different
results, however, American researchers have a larger sample of data to draw their
conclusions from. As for the differences in the types of passive vehicles utilised and
analysed, we expect the passive ownership in Norwegian stocks to be more inelastic and
long-term than in the U.S., which could imply a stronger negative impact on liquidity
and a weaker effect on price efficiency. Lastly, low floats in Norwegian stocks are expected
to further amplify the impact on liquidity, as we define passive ownership relative to
non-adjusted market capitalisation.
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3 Data and Methodology
In this section, we present both the data and methodology used in our analyses throughout
the paper. First, we elaborate the sources of our different types of data and the structure
and size of the samples derived from these sources. Second, we present the variables
utilised in order to carry out the analyses and provide descriptive statistics for these.
Finally, we elaborate on the specific methodology that we apply in our analyses.
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
In total, we utilise data from five different data sets and four different providers. First, we
gather financial data on all publicly traded Norwegian stocks from NHH Børsprosjektet
(Norges Handelshøyskole, 2020) for the 21.5-year period from 01.01.2000 to 30.06.2020.
This includes daily prices, returns, bids and asks, turnovers, shares outstanding and sector
classifications (GICS) for all stocks throughout the period. We also collect the daily
closing value of the OSEBX. In total, we retrieve this data for 591 stocks over an average
of 7.5 years, resulting in a total of 1,118,128 stock-days. We exclude observations of stocks
with a market capitalisation below $27.8 million9 due to low trading activity, reducing
the size of the sample to 540 stocks and 853,779 stock-days. 214 of the stocks are still
listed with an average life of 9.7 years. This means that we have a total of 521,452 daily
observations of stocks that are still listed. This becomes relevant as the fund ownership
data only includes stocks that are currently listed, which limits our analyses to these
stocks. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between stocks that are currently listed and
those that were delisted from the Oslo Stock Exchange at some point in the period.
Second, we collect the stock holdings of all mutual funds and ETFs from the Morningstar
Fund Ownership database through the Morningstar Direct suite (Morningstar, 2020). The
ownership data is provided on a monthly basis for every individual fund, and includes all
individual stock positions on a number of shares basis. The Morningstar ownership data
only includes stocks that are currently listed. This could introduce a bias, as stocks from
Børsprosjektet that are not currently listed are excluded. However, we do not believe that
this sort of “survivorship bias” will affect the analyses conducted, as passive ownership is
9
$27.8 million is equal to NOK 250 million at a USDNOK of 9.00.
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a fairly recent phenomenon, and there is no indication whether delisted (mainly due to
bankruptcy or M&A activities) stocks would have had a high or low passive ownership
relative to others. Out of more than 500,000 funds, 6,814 have at some point held shares
in a Norwegian firm that is currently listed. We emphasise that we are not considering
merely the holdings of Norwegian funds, but rather the Norwegian equity holdings of
all funds. As passive, we classify all funds which name includes certain strings, such
as “INDEX”, “IDX”, “OSEBX” and “MSCI” in both uppercase, lowercase and various
combinations of the two10. Using our classification rules, 871 out of the 6,814 funds are
classified as passive. We merge the ownership data with the financial data by matching
the tickers manually. This means that for every stock in every month, we have the exact
number of shares outstanding and the number of shares held by passive funds. Currently
listed stocks that are not present in the Morningstar database are assigned a passive
ownership share of zero. The 6,814 funds have over time held shares in 185 out of the 214
stocks, whereas the passive ones have held 123 stocks.
Third, we collect the annual end-of-year holdings of the Norwegian equity portfolio of
Folketrygdfondet. From the fund’s annual reports, we manually extract all individual
stock holdings on a number of share basis and merge these with the ticker symbols from
the other data sets. The Morningstar data is on a monthly basis, while the data from
Folketrygdfondet is on an annual basis. Some of our analyses rely on year-over-year changes
between dates that are not end-of-year. Consequently, we assume that Folketrygdfondet
invests gradually over the full course of the year when converting the data to a monthly
basis. This conversion is in no way optimal but we deem it better than the alternative,
which would be to assume that all end-of-year values are representative for the entire year,
implicitly assuming that the fund only invests on the 1st of January each year. In our
sample of stocks that are currently listed, Folketrygdfondet’s AUM has increased from
NOK 10.6 billion in December 1999 to NOK 121.8 billion in June 2020, with 39 portfolio
stocks on average11. The average stock-level fund ownership for our sample, segmented in
passive funds, active funds and the FTF, is provided in Figure 3.2.
10
Complete list: "INDEX", "IDX", "INDEKS", "PASSIVE", "OSEBX", "OBX", "S&P", "SANDP",
"BLOOMBERG", "RUSSELL", "100", "500", "1000", "2000", "3000", "MORNINGSTAR", "FTSE",
"MSCI", "STOXX", "BLACKROCK", "BLKROCK", "STATESTREET", "TARGET".
11
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, our sample size increases with time. In 2000, when the deviations are the
largest, FTF held 59 stocks, while only 25 are included in our sample. Similarly, the actual AUM was
NOK 19.3 billion in December 1999.
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Figure 3.1: Sample Size
This chart illustrates the number of individual stocks in our sample and their
status for each month. As only currently listed stocks can be linked to





















Figure 3.2: Fund Ownership in Sample
This chart illustrates the average fund ownership for each stock in our sample,















Fund Type: Active Index & ETF Folketrygdfondet
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Fourth, we gather information on the date and the time of earnings announcements from
Thomson Reuters Eikon. If the announcement time is before or during the date’s trading
hours, the effective date is the same as the announcement date. If the announcement
time is later than 16:2012, the next trading day is classified as the effective date. For
announcements where only the date but not the time is specified, we classify as the
effective date the current or the following date, based on which of them has the higher
trading volume. The data on earnings announcements is matched with the financial data
and the ownership data manually by ticker. On average, each stock is linked with 20
announcements.
Lastly, also from Thomson Reuters Eikon, we collect a list of all inclusions and exclusions
from the OSEBX. By combining this data with the index constituents in 200113 and today,
we derive a complete list of all the index constituents at any given time. We link this
data with the financial data by ticker symbol and construct dummies indicating whether
a stock at any point in time is included in the OSEBX.
3.2 Variables Selection
We aim to examine how increases in passive ownership have affected the liquidity and price
efficiency of Norwegian stocks. Consequently, we use passive ownership as an independent
variable, and different measures of liquidity and price informativeness as the dependent
variable in our regression models. As stock markets are complex systems, we also include
carefully selected control variables to account for simultaneous effects. All variables will
be presented in the following sections.
3.2.1 Independent Variable: Passive Ownership
First, we need a consistent measure of passive ownership as our independent variable of
interest. As discussed in Section 3.1, our data set contains the number of shares held
by passive funds and Folketrygdfondet on a monthly basis. We calculate the passive
ownership share as the number of shares held by passive vehicles divided by the total
number of shares outstanding. We multiply this share by 100 in order to express passive
12
The OSE trading session ends at 16:20 each day.
13
OSEBX has served as the benchmark index, replacing the TOTX, since 23.05.2001.
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ownership in percentage points. As some of our analyses are based on specific earnings
announcement dates within a certain month, we assume the ownership to be constant
throughout each month14.
3.2.2 Dependent Variables: Liquidity
Active traders can be considered liquidity providers as they are always, at least implicitly,
present in the order book of a stock. At some high (low) price, an active owner would
consider selling (buying) shares, thus providing liquidity in that stock. This is not the case
for passive managers, who do not conduct fundamental analyses and use market orders or
similar types of algorithms when trading. From February 19th to May 31st this year —
during the sharpest economic downfall in modern history — only 5% of Vanguard DC15
investors and 17% of Vanguard retail investors traded in any meaningful way (Vanguard,
2020). Less than 0.5% liquidated their assets and moved to cash. As such price-inelastic
investors hold more of the outstanding shares of a stock, we expect the liquidity of that
stock to decrease. In our analyses, we use two proxies of liquidity.
3.2.2.1 Amihud’s Illiquidity (Illiq)
As our first measure for liquidity, we use the famous illiquidity proxy of Amihud (2002).
This is the most renowned liquidity measure in the financial industry and measures the
price impact of trading in a low-frequency manner (Goyenko et al., 2009). It is derived
using the ratio of the absolute daily stock return to the daily NOK trading volume.





where | returni,t | is the return of stock i on day t expressed in absolute terms, while
turnoveri,t is the trading volume of stock i on day t expressed in NOK millions. We use
14
This assumption does not apply to months where corporate actions (SEOs, stock splits, etc.) have
caused changes in the number of shares outstanding within the month. To avoid spikes in Passive
Ownership in such months, we have manually adjusted the passive ownership share within the month
in question. We believe such adjustments are reasonable, as index funds and ETFs minimise tracking
error, and would therefore need to participate in SEOs. Such adjustments are not performed on the
FTF holdings, as this fund does not necessarily need to adjust their holdings accordingly in such events.
15
DC = Defined Contribution. A pension plan with defined contributions by the employer and the
employee, as opposed to a defined benefit plan.
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annual averages in our analyses and expect changes in Passive Ownership to be positively
associated with changes in Illiq.
3.2.2.2 Abdi and Ranaldo’s Spread (Spread)
Our second proxy for liquidity is the bid-ask spread. More specifically, we use an estimate
of the effective spread, introduced by Abdi and Ranaldo (2017). This estimate is similar
to, and highly correlated with, the famous Roll (1984) spread measure but based on more
easily available information. Further, the Abdi and Ranaldo measure delivers the most
accurate estimates for less liquid stocks (Abdi and Ranaldo, 2017)16. The effective spread,








max (E[(ci,t   ⌘i,t)(ci,t   ⌘i,t+1)], 0) (3.2)
where ci,t is the daily closing log-price, ⌘i,t is the mean of the daily high and low log-prices
and Ni is the number of daily observations for stock i in month m. To mitigate the effect
of negative roots and to achieve the most accurate spread, we use annual averages of
monthly estimates (m). We expect for changes in Passive Ownership to be positively
associated with changes in Spread.
3.2.3 Dependent Variables: Price Informativeness
In the second part of our analysis, we examine the link between passive ownership and
price informativeness. As trading costs increase, active investors should, ceteris paribus,
choose to trade less on the basis of idiosyncratic information (Grossman and Stiglitz,
1980). This is because an increase in trading costs is equivalent to an increase in the cost
of information. An additional effect, proposed by Israeli et al. (2017), is that there will
be less uninformed investors left for informed investors to profit from trading with, as
these migrate to index investing. Both effects lead to less information being embedded in
prices through trading. Further, as more people invest in passive than in active vehicles,
we would expect prices to reflect less stock-specific information. In order to analyse these
effects, we need to establish proxies of price informativeness. As neither the true value
nor all the relevant information of a stock can be quantified, measuring the true price
16
Relative to the TAQ (NYSE Trade and Quote Data) reported spread.
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informativeness is not possible. However, the literature suggests a range of proxies. We
focus on two types of proxies. First, we use three proxies attainable through event studies.
Specifically, we can focus on events where we are certain that new firm-specific information
has become available. That is, earnings announcements. Information on trading and
pricing prior to earnings announcements has been used in multiple academic papers as
a measure of price informativeness (Foster et al., 1984; Pettit, 1976; Sammon, 2020).
The idea behind this is that trading prior to earnings announcements reflects investors’
beliefs regarding the information which will be presented by the firm. We use three such
event-based proxies introduced by Sammon (2020). The fourth proxy measures the extent
to which the price of a stock moves in tandem with the market as a whole. Roll (1988)
suggests that return comovement is an inverse function of the idiosyncratic information —
relative to more market-wide information — embedded in stock prices. All four proxies
will be presented in the following sections.
3.2.3.1 Sammon’s Pre-Earnings Abnormal Volume (CAV )
The first measure of price informativeness is the abnormal trading volume in the days
leading up to the earnings announcement. When the passive ownership in a stock increases,
one would expect the price of the stock to contain less information, as a result of the
aggregate market conducting less firm-specific research, and the incentive mechanisms of
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Sammon compares the trading volume of each day in the
month (22 days) leading up to the announcement with the average volume for the previous
three months (63 days). More specifically, the first measure, cumulative abnormal volume














where Vi,t is the NOK trading volume for stock i at day t. The abnormal volume (AV) for
each day in a 22-day period leading up to the announcement is calculated by dividing the
respective day’s volume by the average daily volume in a fixed window spanning from four
to one month prior to the announcement. The cumulative abnormal return in Equation
3.3, which will serve as the dependent variable in our regression, is simply the sum of the
3.2 Variables Selection 29
abnormal volume (Equation 3.4) in the 22-day period leading up to the announcement
date. This means that if there had not been any excess volume, CAV would be equal to
22, indicating that the trading volume leading up to an earnings announcement is equal
to the trading volume in the absence of an earnings announcement. We expect changes in
CAV to be negatively correlated with changes in Passive Ownership.
3.2.3.2 Sammon’s Pre-Earnings Drift (DM )
A decline in trading volume is not enough to deem pre-earnings prices less informative.
Prices could reflect all relevant information, even though the trading volume has decreased.
Therefore, we also investigate the relationship between passive investing and pre-earnings
announcement drift. The tendency for stock prices to increase (decline) prior to a positive
(negative) earnings announcement is documented in academia (Easton et al., 1984). The
reason that we experience such patterns is the trading of informed investors on signals
of performance or explicit guidance from the firm. Consequently, we would assume
that an increase in passive ownership would reduce the drift prior to a stock’s earnings
announcement, as a smaller share of the market is conducting firm-specific analyses.
Sammon’s measure of drift captures the extent to which pre-earnings returns reflect the
return on the announcement day. It does so by comparing the two returns relative to
one another, so that an overall change in volatility would not lead to biased results.


















, if ri,T < 0
(3.5)
where ri,t is the return of stock i on day t in the period leading up the announcement
date, while ri,T is the return on the announcement date. DM is close to 1 if the drift is
strong, i.e., if the return on the announcement day is small but in the same direction as
the cumulative return of the pre-announcement period. On the other hand, DM is low if
the return on the announcement day is large relative to that of the pre-announcement
period, or if the price moves substantially in the opposite direction. Note that if the
return on the announcement day is negative, the measure in Equation 3.5 is inverted.
This is done so that the interpretation remains the same for negative and positive earnings
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announcements. We expect changes in Passive Ownership to be negatively associated
with changes in DM.
3.2.3.3 Sammon’s Earnings-Day Volatility (QVS)
If we believe that prices contain less of the information about earnings in the days prior to
the announcement, we would assume that this would be made up for on the announcement
day. At the announcement day, much of the uncertainty is removed, and informed
traders are now willing to trade on the stock-specific information presented. Therefore,
if less information about the announcement is acquired by the market in advance, the
announcement itself would have to contain more new information, hence provoke greater
volatility. The quadratic variation share (QVS ) is a measure of the quarterly volatility











is the squared return of stock i at earnings announcement date T and r2
i,t
is
the returns of stock i at day t in quarter T . The ratio is defined as the daily squared
return for the earnings announcement day divided by the sum of daily squared returns
for the announcement quarter. We expect changes in Passive Ownership to be positively
associated with changes in (QVS ).
3.2.3.4 Stock Return Synchronicity (Synch)
With the fourth proxy, we want to examine the relationship between a stock’s passive
ownership and its return comovement with the market. To do this, we use the adjusted R2
from a market model regression. Roll famously suggests that low R2 statistics in his asset
pricing regressions could be a sign of high price informativeness. In his view, stock prices
can reflect three types of information: market-wide information, sector-wide information
and stock-specific information. This means that the residual in a market model with
stock-specific returns explained by sector and market returns will describe the amount
of firm-specific information embedded in the price. The relationship was formalised by
Durnev et al. (2003) and has been recognised as a proxy for price efficiency in several
articles (Bramante et al., 2015; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). Specifically, we regress the
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daily returns of each stock against the returns of the benchmark index and the respective
stock’s sector over the course of a year17. The adjusted R2 of this regression is our proxy
for price informativeness. In line with Israeli et al. (2017), we truncate negative values of
R
2. High values of R2 implies that prices move more in tandem with that of the market,
and thus contain less firm-specific information (Roll, 1988). The regression from which
the adjusted R2 is derived is:
reti,t =  1 ⇤ retOSEBX,t +  2 ⇤ retOSEBX,t 1 +  3 ⇤ retSEC,t +  4 ⇤ retSEC,t 1 + ✏i,t (3.7)
where reti,t, retOSEBX,t and retSEC,t are the daily returns at time t of stock i, the OSEBX
and the stock’s sector, respectively. The model in Equation 3.7 is run once for each
stock-year. Stocks with less than 75 daily observations or less than three other stocks in
their sector are excluded to avoid a biased measure. In line with Israeli et al. (2017) and













is the adjusted R2 from Equation 3.7 for stock i in year y. We expect changes
in Passive Ownership to be positively associated with changes in Synch.
3.2.4 Control Variables
It is natural to assume that there are other factors than passive ownership influencing our
dependent variables. In order to deal with issues of endogeneity, we have included various
control variables which we will present in the following section.
In all our models, we include market capitalisation as a control variable. We find it
intuitive for market capitalisation to be the most important single factor in explaining
both liquidity and price informativeness. In relation to liquidity, we expect large stocks
to have tighter spreads and a lower price impact per NOK traded. Moreover, in relation
to price informativeness, we believe that larger stocks in general are being followed by
a larger number of analysts and professional traders. This would imply higher price
informativeness. However, larger stocks are also a larger part of indices and sectors, which
17
We use OSEBX as the benchmark index and the two first digits of the GICS as the sector.
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could imply the contrary, especially when using the synchronicity measure. Nevertheless,
market capitalisation seems like an integral control variable in this analysis and we express
this variable by the natural logarithm.
Across all models, we include the active ownership of a stock. Glosten and Harris (1988)
document a significant relationship between fund ownership and liquidity. As we already
account for passive ownership, we should also include active, which is defined as Fund
Ownership - Passive Ownership. We include Active Ownership as a control variable in
price efficiency analyses as well, due to our reliance on the link between liquidity and
price informativeness (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). This control variable also addresses
the potential role of active investors as liquidity providers. We calculate Active Ownership
as the total number of shares of a stock held by active funds divided by the stock’s total
number of shares outstanding.
For the liquidity analyses, we include both volatility and market-adjusted volatility as
control variables. In general, we believe that both spreads and price impact might increase
in periods of high volatility. However, there might be differences in how liquidity is affected
when the overall market volatility changes, and when firm-specific information leads to
changes in volatility. For instance, firm-specific volatility could lead to increases in the
stock’s trading volume to a greater extent than a market-wide rise in volatility could.
Volatility is defined as the annualised standard deviation of returns, calculated as the
standard deviation of a stock’s returns multiplied by the square root of the number of
trading days. Idiosyncratic Volatility, on the other hand, is the return of a stock, less
the return of OSEBX, squared. We also include trading volume, Volume, as a control
variable in the liquidity analyses. This variable is calculated as the total shares traded
divided by the total shares outstanding per day. Especially the price impact measure is
sensitive to changes in trading volume in small-cap and mid-cap stocks. As illustrated in
the correlation matrix, Table 3.1, we emphasise that the link between volume, volatility
and liquidity could be problematic when interpreting the coefficients.
Specific to the analyses on price informativeness, we include Beta as a control variable.
We would not want to interpret high-beta stocks as having less informative prices (Li et al.,
2014). That is, for a stock with a relatively high beta, we allow for idiosyncratic information
to be deemed less important by the market, relative to market-wide information. We have
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calculated Beta as the covariance between the returns of a stock and OSEBX, divided by
the variance of the returns of OSEBX. Lastly, we also include Idiosyncratic Volatility in
the analyses on the event-based measures, as we believe that high idiosyncratic volatility
throughout the year could affect the perceived significance of earnings announcements.
We do not include this variable in the fourth price informativeness measure, Synch, as the
absence of idiosyncratic volatility is equivalent to a high synchronicity value.
3.3 Methodology
In this section, we present the econometric approaches utilised in order to address our
research questions. The analysis of each hypothesis is split into two parts. First, we
investigate potential links using a panel data regression model both including and excluding
control variables and fixed effects. Second, we analyse the same relationships using a
difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, in order to potentially establish causal links. In
the following, both approaches will be presented.
In line with Hamm (2014), Israeli et al. (2017) and Sammon (2020), we use a first
differences approach, considering the changes in the variables instead of their levels. While
the common reason for using a first differences approach is limiting issues with endogeneity,
we already apply an equivalent method with the inclusion of fixed effects. The reason for
our choice is rather that such a design limits the impact of the levels of Passive Ownership
being non-stationary over time, as well as autocorrelation affecting our coefficients. The
use of differences variables throughout our analyses leads to low R2 in our models. In
financial regressions, levels variables can often inflate the R2, as most variables are sticky
and move in one direction over time. Additionally, the adjusted R2 penalises the use of
many independent variables18. As we utilise first differences models with both time and
stock fixed effects, we therefore expect low R2s across models. However, we do not deem
the adjusted R2 to be crucial for our analyses, as we measure relatively small effects in
very complex structures. Further, we include neither levels nor interaction variables, in
order to facilitate intuitive interpretations of our regression models. We do, however, wish
to address the large dispersion in market capitalisation in our sample. The inclusion of
the level of Log MCAP could introduce multicollinearity in our regressions, as large firms
18
21 years and 214 unique stocks result in 235 additional independent variables when we include time
and stock fixed effects in regressions on the annual sample.
34 3.3 Methodology
are the ones experiencing the largest inflows of passive capital. Instead, we include for all
regression models an additional table where the same models are run on different terciles
of the sample, sorted by market capitalisation. These tables are provided in Appendix A2.
We derive the change variables by taking the one-period difference in all variables defined
in this chapter and use these new variables in our regressions. In the analyses on liquidity
and synchronicity, the   denotes the differences between yeart and yeart 1. In the
analyses on earnings announcements, the   denotes the differences between quartert and
quartert 4
19. We consider the year-over-year change in order to address issues regarding
seasonality, as it could for instance be argued that market participants consider 1st quarter
announcements more important than 2nd quarter ones.
3.3.1 Correlational Study
The first part of the analysis of both hypotheses consists of panel data regressions, in
which we study the correlation between changes in Passive Ownership and changes in
the abovementioned dependent variables. We use annual or quarterly observations, and
include time fixed effects, allowing us to control for structural changes in the information
environment on the Oslo Stock Exchange, such as the prevalence of stock trading in
general or the prevalence of performance guiding by firms. For instance, imagine if firms
in 2001 in aggregate were more inclined than firms in 2019 to reveal information to the
market ahead of earnings announcements. This could lead to biased estimates on the
relationship between Passive Ownership and price informativeness, as Passive Ownership
has increased consistently in the same period. Using year fixed effects, each year is
assigned a unique intercept, which can absorb such differences or control for unique market
environments impacting our measures, such as the GFC and the COVID-19 crisis. We
also control for differences between stocks, by applying stock fixed effects. The earnings
of some firms might for instance be more predictable, and the stock could therefore have
high pre-earnings volumes and drift. Some stocks might even have different response
coefficients on information. Such time-invariant differences are absorbed by each stock’s
intercept. In order to control for heteroskedasticity20, we apply robust standard errors
19
For observations of quartert where the quartert 4 is missing, we take the difference between quartert
and quartert 1.
20
The Durbin-Watson test is not significant for any of our models, indicating no autocorrelation. This is
primarily through the use of the first differences design.
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using the White method. Following the recommendations of Petersen (2009), we cluster
standard errors by stock, as our data involves a larger number of stocks than years or
quarters.
For all of the dependent variables presented in this chapter, we apply variations of the
following model:






 i ⇤ FEi +
TX
t=1
 t ⇤ TEt + ✏i,t,d (3.9)
where  Yi,t,d is the change in the dependent variable d of stock i from time t   1 to t.
Similarly,  POi,t is the change in Passive Ownership of stock i from time t  1 to time t.
 Ci,t,j is the change in control variable j for stock i from time t  1 to t, while FEi and
TEt is the stock and year fixed effects, respectively.
3.3.2 Quasi-Experiment
In the second part of the analyses of each hypothesis, we use quasi-exogenous shocks
in our passive ownership measure as the treatment in a difference-in-differences (DiD)
regression. The shocks are index inclusions21. When a stock is included in the OSEBX,
funds that track the index must purchase shares, and the passive ownership will increase
substantially, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. According to our hypotheses, this should lead
to a decrease in liquidity and price efficiency.
Such an approach requires for inclusions to be randomly assigned. The inclusions to the
OSEBX are decided by a series of rules and criteria on a semi-annual basis and not by
a committee directly, like the S&P 500. These criteria are related to liquidity, sector,
market capitalisation and free float, with the objective of the index to best represent the
Norwegian stock market. Consequently, the selection of index constituents is not randomly
assigned. One could also argue that due to the size of the Norwegian market, the number
of potential constituents is so small that it should be possible for market participants to
predict which stocks that are going to be included.
In order to deal with this, we construct two groups of control stocks in addition to the
21
We only consider inclusions, as exclusions are likely to be based on fundamental aspects of the stock,
such as poor performance or the lack of liquidity. Further, it is more difficult to construct reasonable
control groups for such stocks.
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treated group22. The first group (Control 1) contains stocks in the same sector as the
treated stock and have a similar market capitalisation23. Further, stocks in this group
can not be a part of the OSEBX at any time during the four-year period. These stocks
are essentially stocks that we believe could have been included instead of the one that
was actually included. This way, we can posit that within this group of stocks, inclusions
are "as if" randomly assigned. The second group of control stocks (Control 2) are stocks
that adhere to the same requirements but are members of the OSEBX during the entire
four-year period. This period consists of a two-year period before, and a two-year period
after the stock in the treated group was included to the index. The quarter of inclusion
and the subsequent quarter are excluded from the sample to limit index inclusion effects,
as discussed in Section 2.6.1.
Figure 3.3: Passive Ownership and Index Inclusions
This chart illustrates the average passive ownership of the quasi-
experiment sample, segmented by group affiliation. The area























Group: Control 1 Control 2 Treated
22
With "the treatment" being index inclusion.
23
A treated stock can be assigned control stocks that are in the same sector while having a market
capitalisation of no less than 50% and no more than 200% of the market capitalisation of the treated
stock. This means that a treated stock with a NOK 10 billion MCap can be assigned control stocks
ranging from NOK 5 billion to NOK 20 billion in MCap.
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In total, we have 91 stocks in the treated group. The first control group contains 54 stocks,
while the second contains 53 stocks. Figure 3.3 illustrates a 1.65 percentage points increase
in passive ownership in the treated group between the two periods. This is expected, and
serves as the basis for our natural experiment. At the same time, the two control groups
have no specific trend in their passive ownership level during the periods. In line with
Sammon (2020), we use the differences between the average of the first and the second
period as our sample24. This way, the model compares the differences between the two
periods for the two groups25. The DiD-estimator is a dummy variable indicating whether
or not a stock is in the treated group. Consequently, the coefficient of the DiD-estimator
will be the difference in the difference between the treated stocks and the control stocks
over the two periods. Specifically, the regressions model is defined as:






 s ⇤ SEs +
MX
m=1
 m ⇤MIEm + ✏i,d (3.10)
where  Yi,d is the change in the dependent variable d of stock i. DiDi is a dummy variable
indicating whether or not stock i has been included, and  Ci,j is the change in the control
variable j for stock i. Finally, SEs and MIEm is the sector and month of index inclusion
fixed effect, respectively.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
In this last section of the chapter, we present the descriptive statistics of the data utilised
throughout the analyses. First, we present simple statistics for all of the independent
variables, including Passive Ownership. Second, we describe the dependent variables and
illustrate their trends. Third, we describe the data used in the quasi-experiments.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide information on the data used in the first part of the analyses.
The statistics are split into two separate tables due to differences in the number of
observations, as there are more earnings announcements than stock-years. All continuous
change variables, such as   Log MCAP and   Passive Ownership are winsorised at the 1
and 99 per cent level to mitigate the influence of statistical outliers in the analyses.
24
The averages mitigate the downward bias in the standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004).
25
The treated group includes treated stocks, and the non-treated group includes control groups 1 and 2.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Annual Sample
This table provides the number of observations, means, standard deviations and
distributions for the annual sample. The sample consists of pooled cross-sections in the
2001-2020 sample period. Illiq is the annual average of daily absolute returns divided
by turnover in mNOK. Spread is the annual average of the monthly average spread
based on log close, high and low prices. Synch is the log-transformed R2 from a market
model where stock returns are explained by market and sector returns. The   of these
dependent variables is the difference between yeart and yeart 1. Passive Ownership
is defined as the sum of shares held by passive funds, divided by shares outstanding.
Active Ownership is defined as the sum of shares held by active funds, divided by shares
outstanding. Log MCAP is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. Changes
in these independent variables are calculated as end-of-year changes. Volatility is the
annualised standard deviation of returns, while Volume is the average daily shares
traded scaled by shares outstanding. Beta is the covariance of returns between a
stock and OSEBX, divided by the variance of OSEBX. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the
annual sum of the squared differences between daily returns of a stock and OSEBX.
All change variables are winsorised at the 1% level, while  Synch is winsorised at
the 5% level. The (%) indicates that the variable is expressed in percentage points.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. p25 Median p75 Max.
Dependent Variables
Illiq (%) 2432 6.41 16.66 0.00 0.15 0.93 4.55 108.19
  Illiq (%) 2218 0.22 8.28 -38.70 -0.34 0.00 0.51 38.87
Spread (%) 2432 1.23 1.16 0.00 0.56 0.97 1.60 22.72
  Spread (%) 2218 -0.08 1.07 -3.38 -0.60 -0.09 0.43 3.37
Synch 2104 -2.06 2.10 -6.91 -3.19 -1.85 -0.74 7.28
  Synch 1882 0.17 1.31 -2.32 -0.58 0.10 0.86 2.99
Passive Ownership Variables
Passive Ownership (%) 2432 2.47 4.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.66 21.32
  Passive Ownership (%) 2218 0.22 1.11 -3.55 0.00 0.00 0.14 5.28
Control Variables
Active Ownership (%) 2432 5.20 7.53 0.00 0.00 1.93 7.54 58.29
  Active Ownership (%) 2218 0.80 2.18 -4.49 0.00 0.00 1.18 11.06
Log MCAP 2432 21.54 1.66 19.34 20.17 21.34 22.64 27.01
  Log MCAP 2218 0.03 0.56 -1.73 -0.22 0.03 0.30 1.74
Volatility (%) 2418 38.13 15.80 0.00 26.86 35.78 48.95 117.33
  Volatility (%) 2196 1.01 13.56 -33.60 -6.69 -0.24 7.47 41.98
Volume (%) 2432 0.32 0.73 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.34 19.36
  Volume (%) 2218 0.01 0.37 -1.50 -0.04 -0.00 0.04 1.96
Beta 2235 0.67 0.53 -6.25 0.30 0.61 0.97 7.29
  Beta 2021 0.04 0.34 -0.85 -0.16 0.01 0.22 1.06
Idiosyncratic Volatility 2432 0.47 7.46 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.32 362.01
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 2218 0.01 0.34 -1.44 -0.05 -0.00 0.06 1.46
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Quarterly Sample
This table provides the number of observations, means, standard deviations and
distributions for the quarterly sample. The sample consists of pooled cross-sections
in the 2000-2020 sample period. CAV is the sum of daily volume over a period
of one month before an earnings announcement, excluding the announcement day,
divided by normal volume. DM is the cumulative return of the month before the
announcement, excluding the announcement day, divided by the cumulative return
of the same month including the announcement day. QVS is defined as the squared
return on the announcement day, divided by the sum of squared returns for the full
quarter. Passive Ownership is defined as the sum of shares held by passive funds,
divided by shares outstanding. Active Ownership is defined as the sum of shares held
by active funds, divided by shares outstanding. Log MCAP is the natural logarithm
of market capitalisation. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the annual sum of the squared
differences between daily returns of a stock and OSEBX. Beta is the covariance of
returns between a stock and OSEBX, divided by the variance of OSEBX. All change
variables are calculated as quartert less quartert 4 as long as applicable, and winsorised
at the 1% level. The (%) indicates that the variable is expressed in percentage points.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. p25 Median p75 Max.
Dependent Variables
CAV 4124 22.33 14.60 0.00 14.02 19.64 26.59 181.95
  CAV 4116 0.04 17.67 -60.90 -7.67 -0.02 7.69 60.96
DM 4125 96.21 4.02 56.50 94.78 97.28 98.92 105.76
  DM 4117 -0.12 4.75 -15.38 -2.41 -0.01 2.20 14.99
QVS (%) 4124 6.12 8.97 0.00 0.45 2.44 7.97 69.33
  QVS (%) 3354 -5.01 8.46 -40.50 -6.80 -1.47 0.50 1.00
Passive Ownership Variables
Passive Ownership (%) 4125 3.72 4.65 0.00 0.00 1.03 7.19 21.00
  Passive Ownership (%) 4125 0.30 1.03 -2.61 0.00 0.00 0.52 4.55
Control Variables
Active Ownership (%) 4125 5.50 7.13 0.00 0.03 2.94 8.39 49.46
  Active Ownership (%) 4125 0.75 1.90 -3.83 0.00 0.08 1.15 9.36
Log MCAP 4125 22.32 1.67 19.34 21.05 22.28 23.32 27.14
  Log MCAP 4125 0.07 0.55 -1.68 -0.19 0.06 0.32 1.87
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4125 0.58 11.28 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.26 362.37
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 4125 -0.00 0.25 -1.39 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.95
Beta 4125 0.81 0.47 -0.65 0.46 0.76 1.10 3.00
  Beta 4125 0.03 0.29 -0.77 -0.14 0.01 0.18 0.94
40 3.4 Descriptive Statistics
The average Passive Ownership in the annual sample (Table 3.1) is 2.47%. This is
slightly lower than in the samples of Hamm (2014) and Israeli et al. (2017), however,
the variance in our data is larger. This is likely due to passive investing being more
prevalent in U.S. stocks, especially in the first years of our sample, as illustrated in Figure
2.2. Another reason is that our analyses include relatively smaller firms. The mean of
Log MCAP is roughly $250 million26 in the annual data, which is about half of that in
Hamm (2014) and Israeli et al. (2017). In the sample related to earnings announcements
(Table 3.2) both market capitalisation and Passive Ownership are more similar to the
existing literature. This confirms our notion that the deviation in the annual data is
caused by market capitalisation. This is because large firms are over-represented in the
event-based sample, relative to the annual sample. Both changes in Log MCAP and
changes in Passive Ownership for both samples correspond roughly with the data used in
the other two papers. The other independent variables, including Active Ownership, show
little variation between the two samples.
Considering the dependent variables, the most notable deviations from prior literature
are those of the liquidity proxies. The average Spread in our sample is 123 basis points,
however, with a large standard deviation of 116 bps. This high standard deviation is also
likely caused by the small-cap firms in our data set. The standard deviation for changes
in Spread is about twice as large as the one in Israeli et al. (2017). As illustrated in
Figure 3.4, Spread is larger for smaller firms. From the same figure, we see that Spread
shows no sign of any long-term trend but is negatively correlated to economic cycles. The
same interpretation is assumed for the illiquidity measure. Evident through Table 3.1
and Figure 3.4, small firms lead to an increase in the mean of the illiquidity measure in
our sample. Further, the arithmetic mean of the illiquidity measure — as illustrated by
the dark blue line in Figure 3.4 — reacts heavily to economic cycles, which could imply
that the liquidity of small-cap firms is almost completely drained of liquidity in uncertain
markets, such as during the GFC. We emphasise that the analyses will be run on different
groups of firms sorted by market capitalisation, in order to control for the outliers in our
liquidity measures.
26(e21.54) ⇤ USDNOK, where USDNOK is 9.00.
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The price informativeness measures of Sammon (2020), CAV, DM and QVS, are provided
in Table 3.2. The volume measure, CAV, has a mean of 22.3. This implies that the average
volume over the month leading up to an earnings announcement date is not higher than
the volume in the rest of the quarter27. Figure 3.5 illustrates no significant changes in
the pre-earnings volume between the first and the second half of our observations, sorted
by date. We would expect for the volume prior to the announcement to be lower in the
second period, due to the overall increase in passive ownership. Further, the DM level in
our sample is slightly lower than in Sammon’s sample, which possibly could indicate that
Norwegian stocks are priced less efficiently in the pre-earnings period. Evident in Figure
3.5, we show that for earnings announcements with positive news, the drift is significantly
weaker in the second period, and the movement on the announcement date is stronger.
For observations of negative announcements in the same figure, the trend is ambiguous.
The synchronicity measure has an arithmetic mean of -2.06, which is equivalent to an
R
2 of about 0.115 in the market model described in Equation 3.7. Figure 3.4 illustrates
how the synchronicity measure varies a great deal over the sample period, and that the
value-weighted average of Synch is above 0 as opposed to -2.06. A Synch of 0 is equivalent
to an R2 of 0.50. Once again, we illustrate the large differences between different levels of
market capitalisation. This is not surprising, and merely underlines the limited number of
stocks in our sample and its large dispersion in size. Consequently, we believe for changes
in Log MCAP to be a crucial control variable in our analyses, and possibly also for the
effects of passive investing to differ between different size samples.
Lastly, we review the data for the second part of our analyses using the difference-in-
differences approach which is provided in Table A3.1 in Appendix A3. This is a limited
data set, as only a total of 91 stocks have been added to the index during our sample
period. Further, our first control group of stocks that are similar but were not concluded
consists of 54 stocks, and the second control group of stocks already included amount
to 53 stocks. Unsurprisingly, changes in Active Ownership are larger in this sample, as,
for instance, active funds with strict mandates could be restricted from holding stocks
not included in the index. Changes in both Volatility and Idiosyncratic Volatility have
negative means, while changes in Beta are larger than in the full annual sample.
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The trading volume in the 22-day period is scaled by the average volume in the rest of the quarter, so
that a CAV of 22 implies zero abnormal volume.
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The average changes in Spread and Illiq are more negative for the DiD sample than our
for the annual sample. As we would expect, this indicates that OSEBX inclusion, ceteris
paribus, has a positive effect on liquidity. Changes in Synch are more positive for this
sample, at 0.26 versus 0.17 in the full sample. These trends are the reason why we apply
control variables in our DiD-models. Lastly, the changes in the event-based measures
generally correspond to those in the full sample. However, across all dependent variables,
the variation is lower than in the quasi-experiment sample than in the full sample. This is







Figure 3.4: Spread, Illiquidity and Synchronicity Measures
These charts illustrate the levels of Spread, Illiq and Synch over time. The arithmetic mean is




















































Figure 3.5: Return and Volume at Earnings Announcements
These charts illustrate the equally-weighted cumulative returns for positive and negative news on the earnings announcement
day, as well as trading volume scaled by normal volume. The dark blue lines are based on observations from 2000
to 2012, while the light blue lines are based on observations from 2013 to 2020. With this segmentation, each































































In this chapter, we present the results of our analyses. First, we review the Pearson’s
correlations of the variables used in the analyses. Second, we present the results on both
hypotheses and discuss possible causes and implications.
4.1 Pearson’s Correlations
Before analysing the hypotheses, we briefly review the Pearson’s correlations between
key variables. The correlation coefficients for the two samples (annual and quarterly) are
provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The correlations for the DiD-sample is provided in Table
A3.2 in Appendix A3.
In general, we note that the Pearson’s correlations are low. This is expected, as we
use the first-differences design. Using such a design, we alleviate strong correlations
due to sticky levels of certain variables. This also means that multicollinearity is likely
not an issue in our analyses. While there is no general consensus regarding the level at
which multicollinearity becomes an issue, coefficients below 0.7 are generally considered
unproblematic (Booth et al., 1994). Additionally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is
never above 2 for any variables, with 5 commonly used as a threshold (Sheather, 2009).
The VIFs are provided in Table A4.1 in Appendix A4.
Considering the relationships between changes in Passive Ownership and changes in our
dependent variables in the annual sample, the correlations do not necessarily correspond
with our hypotheses. This is the case for both liquidity proxies. However, we stress that
the Pearson correlation between two variables should not be interpreted rigidly, especially
when the expected relationship between the independent variable of interest and the
dependent variable is small. An analysis of correlation coefficients does not allow for the
use of control variables and is therefore likely to involve simultaneous biases. The Pearson’s
correlations between changes in Passive Ownership and changes in Illiq and Spread are
-0.01 and 0.00, respectively. This is not necessarily surprising as the correlation between
changes in Log MCAP and Passive Ownership intuitively is positive. Further, both
changes in Illiq and Spread are negatively correlated with changes in Log MCAP, which
is also intuitive. The reason for the ambiguous coefficients between changes in Passive
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Ownership and changes in our liquidity measures could therefore be that stocks receive
more inflows from passive vehicles as they grow larger, while at the same time experiencing
improved liquidity. Changes in Log MCAP could also be the reason why changes in
Passive Ownership is positively correlated to changes in Synch, a relationship consistent
with our second hypothesis. This merely points out the importance of controlling for
changes in Log MCAP in our analyses, which we do across all models.
The quarterly sample includes the three event-based proxies. From Table 4.2, we see that
changes in Passive Ownership are negatively correlated to changes in pre-earnings trading
(CAV ). This is consistent with our second hypothesis. However, we see no signs of a similar
relationship between changes in Passive Ownership and changes in the pre-earning drift
(DM ) or in the earnings-day volatility (QVS ). Once again, we stress that the suggested
relationship could be small and that there could be other factors interfering with the
correlations. That being said, we note that changes in QVS and changes in DM display
a high negative correlation. This is expected, as a weaker drift should indicate more
earnings-day volatility. At the same time, changes in CAV is neither correlated to changes
in DM nor changes in QVS. This is unexpected, and could indicate that the three measures
do not measure price informativeness in the same fashion.
Lastly, we consider the Pearson’s correlations for the DiD sample, which is provided in
Table A3.2 in Appendix A3. Changes in Spread are negatively correlated with OSEBX
Inclusion. From the literature on index inclusion effects (Petajisto, 2011), we know that
there might be positive returns associated with index inclusions. Further, it is intuitive
that spreads decrease as firms grow. This way, the negative relationship between changes
in Spread and OSEBX Inclusion might be caused by both variables’ correlation with
changes in Log MCAP. The same arguments could be applied to the correlation between
OSEBX Inclusion and changes in Synch, as a growing firm constitutes a larger part of
both the market and the sector on which the R2 is based. Therefore, we include changes
in Log MCAP as a control variable in the regression models. The correlation between
OSEBX Inclusion and changes in Illiq is unexpectedly negative, which we believe could






Table 4.1: Pearson’s Correlation for Annual Sample
This table provides Pearson’s correlations for the annual sample. The sample consists of pooled cross-sections in the 2001-2020 sample
period. Illiq is the annual average of daily absolute returns divided by turnover in mNOK. Spread is the annual average of the monthly
average spread based on log close, high and low prices. Synch is the log-transformed R2 from a market model where stock returns
are explained by market and sector returns. The   of these dependent variables is the difference between yeart and yeart 1. Passive
Ownership (PO) is defined as the sum of shares held by passive funds, divided by shares outstanding. Active Ownership (AO) is defined as
the sum of shares held by active funds, divided by shares outstanding. Log MCAP is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation.
Changes in these independent variables are calculated as end-of-year changes. Volatility is the annualised standard deviation of returns,
while Volume is the average daily shares traded scaled by shares outstanding. Beta is the covariance of returns between a stock and
OSEBX, divided by the variance of OSEBX. Idiosyncratic Volatility (IdVol) is the annual sum of the squared differences between
daily returns of a stock and OSEBX. All change variables are winsorised at the 1% level.  Synch is winsorised at the 5% level.
Illiq   Illiq Spread   Spread Synch   Synch PO   PO AO   AO Log MCAP   Log MCAP Volatility   Volatility Volume   Volume Beta   Beta IdVol   IdVol
Illiq 1.00
  Illiq 0.34 1.00
Spread 0.16 0.08 1.00
  Spread 0.04 0.11 0.58 1.00
Synch -0.37 0.04 -0.17 0.00 1.00
  Synch -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 0.33 1.00
PO -0.21 -0.01 -0.19 -0.02 0.47 -0.02 1.00
  PO -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.37 1.00
AO -0.19 -0.03 -0.20 -0.08 0.23 0.07 0.44 0.21 1.00
  AO -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.18 0.12 0.56 1.00
Log MCAP -0.32 -0.07 -0.30 -0.05 0.68 -0.01 0.65 0.23 0.33 0.14 1.00
  Log MCAP -0.04 -0.17 -0.13 -0.21 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.20 1.00
Volatility 0.05 0.01 0.34 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.17 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13 1.00
  Volatility -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.19 0.04 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.03 -0.20 0.42 1.00
Volume -0.14 -0.07 0.09 -0.01 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.28 0.02 1.00
  Volume -0.02 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.43 1.00
Beta -0.30 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.65 0.19 0.25 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.34 -0.06 0.41 0.09 0.32 0.09 1.00
  Beta -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 -0.00 0.19 0.58 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.29 0.05 0.16 0.34 1.00
IdVol 0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.05 1.00






Table 4.2: Pearson’s Correlation for Quarterly Sample
This table provides Pearson’s correlations for the quarterly sample. The sample consists of pooled cross-sections in the 2000-2020 sample
period. CAV is the sum of daily volume over a period of one month before an earnings announcement, excluding the announcement day,
divided by normal volume. DM is the cumulative return of the month before the announcement, excluding the announcement day, divided
by the cumulative return of the same month including the announcement day. QVS is defined as the squared return on the announcement
day, divided by the sum of squared returns for the full quarter. Passive Ownership (PO) is defined as the sum of shares held by passive
funds, divided by shares outstanding. Active Ownership (AO) is defined as the sum of shares held by active funds, divided by shares
outstanding. Log MCAP is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. Idiosyncratic Volatility (IdVol) is the annual sum of the
squared differences between daily returns of a stock and OSEBX. Beta is the covariance of returns between a stock and OSEBX, divided
by the variance of OSEBX. All change variables are calculated as quartert less quartert 4 as long as applicable, and winsorised at the 1% level.
CAV   CAV DM   DM QVS   QVS PO   PO AO   AO Log MCAP   Log MCAP IdVol   IdVol Beta   Beta
CAV 1.00
  CAV 0.66 1.00
DM 0.01 0.01 1.00
  DM -0.01 -0.01 0.64 1.00
QVS -0.02 -0.01 -0.59 -0.42 1.00
  QVS 0.02 -0.01 0.10 -0.42 -0.21 1.00
PO -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.19 -0.18 1.00
  PO -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.35 1.00
AO 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.15 -0.18 0.44 0.24 1.00
  AO -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.12 0.20 0.08 0.55 1.00
Log MCAP 0.02 -0.03 0.12 0.01 0.17 -0.16 0.62 0.24 0.25 0.10 1.00
  Log MCAP 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 0.13 1.00
IdVol -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.00 1.00
  IdVol 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.28 0.07 1.00
Beta 0.02 -0.05 -0.17 -0.00 0.07 -0.09 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.27 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 1.00
  Beta -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.00 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.33 1.00
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4.2 Main Results
In this section, we present the results of our analyses on both hypotheses. For each
hypothesis, we give a brief summary of our most important findings, before providing
a more in-depth examination of the specific models with interpretations of the different
variables and their coefficients.
4.2.1 H1: Passive Ownership and Liquidity
Main Findings (Table 4.3 - 4.4). We first review the findings from our analysis of
Hypothesis 1. We posit that an increase in passive ownership should negatively affect the
liquidity of a stock. As discussed in Section 2.4, a shift from active to passive investing
could imply a decrease in liquidity caused by the differing ways in which the two types
of investors trade in the market, but also by their different investment horizon. On the
contrary, an increase in passive ownership is also associated with an increase in the shares
available for lending, which could imply an increase in liquidity. As proxies for liquidity,
we use the price impact measure of Amihud (2002) and the spread estimator of Abdi and
Ranaldo (2017).
As illustrated in Table 4.3, we find that increases in passive ownership are significantly
associated with decreases in liquidity. The interpretation is the same using both proxies,
and indicate that a 1% increase in passive ownership is associated with a 9.2 bps increase
in the price impact of trading and a 3.1 bps increase in the spread. Applying the models
to samples with stocks of different sizes in Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the Appendices, we
find that the effect on the illiquidity measure is considerably smaller for large firms. In
general, our findings are consistent with our expectations and indicate that the negative
effects of passive ownership on liquidity outweighs the benefits from increases in securities
lending shown by Sørmo (2016). Our findings are larger than those of Hamm (2014) and
Israeli et al. (2017), which again is consistent with the notion that the effects are larger
for smaller and less liquid firms. Using the quasi-experiment setting in Table 4.4, the
coefficient is similar to what we those identified using the full sample. However, they are
not significantly different from zero and we can not infer a causal relationship, likely due
to our limited number of observations.
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Table 4.3: Liquidity and Passive Ownership
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in two liquidity
proxies and changes in passive ownership. The sample consists of 211 stocks and
2,196 or 2,218 stock-year observations in the period from 2001 to 2020. Models (2)
and (4) include control variables and fixed effects for stock and year, while models (1)
and (3) include no such elements. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to
heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses. Corresponding tables with the same
models run on different subsamples are provided in Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the Appendices.
Dependent variable:
  Illiq (%)   Spread (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
  Passive Ownership (%) 0.010 0.092⇤ 0.010 0.031⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.052) (0.018) (0.012)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.217⇤⇤⇤  0.013
(0.078) (0.009)
  Log MCAP  1.797⇤⇤⇤  0.269⇤⇤⇤
(0.455) (0.050)
  Volatility (%)  0.037 0.007⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.003)
  Volume (%)  3.105⇤⇤⇤  0.132
(0.732) (0.081)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.855⇤⇤ 0.542⇤⇤⇤
(0.819) (0.138)
Stock FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,218 2,196 2,218 2,196
Adjusted R2  0.105  0.079  0.105  0.045
F Statistic 0.003 12.505⇤⇤⇤ 0.179 23.325⇤⇤⇤
(df = 1; 2006) (df = 6; 1960) (df = 1; 2006) (df = 6; 1960)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Findings in Correlational Study (Table 4.3). Column (1) and (2) in Table 4.3 use
Amihud’s illiquidity as the dependent variable, while column (3) and (4) use Abdi and
Ranaldo’s spread. In models (1) and (3), we exclude all control variables and fixed effects.
In models (2) and (4), we control for stock and year fixed effects and include control
variables.
In column (1), changes in Passive Ownership is positively correlated to changes in Illiq,
however, the coefficient is not significant at any meaningful cut-off level. Explaining
changes in the price impact of trading simply with changes in our measure of passive
ownership seems unrealistic. As discussed, such a model likely involves issues with
endogeneity. For instance, increased passive ownership is associated with increased market
capitalisation, which in turn is negatively correlated to illiquidity. In column (2), we
control for changes in market capitalisation and other variables nominated by the literature
on liquidity. In line with Hypothesis 1, we now find a positive association between changes
in Passive Ownership and Illiq, significant at the 10% level. Specifically, we find that a
one percentage point increase in passive ownership is associated with a 9.2 bps increase in
the average impact of every NOK 1 million traded. This represents a 1.4% increase from
the sample’s mean and is slightly lower than the findings of Israeli et al. (2017), who find
a one percentage point increase in ETF ownership to be associated with a 2.1% increase
in returns. As illustrated in Figure 3.4, smaller firms are relatively less liquid, especially
when using the Amihud proxy. In Table A2.1 in Appendix A2, we provide the model in
column (2) for six additional samples. By using only observations of the largest tercile of
firms (column (6) in Table A2.1), the coefficient is about 1/3 of that with the full sample,
meaning that a one percentage point increase is associated with a 2.7 bps increase in the
price impact of every NOK 1 million traded28. The coefficient is significant at the 5%
level.
Through the control variables we document that, as firms grow, they also tend to experience
a decrease in the price impact of trading. This is likely due to several simultaneous effects
such as the attraction of new investors due to recent returns, but also more long-term
effects such as a more dispersed base of active investors leading to tighter intervals in
28
The illiquidity measure is very sensitive to deviations in trading volume. Therefore, the absolute value
of the coefficient — even the one for the largest 3
rd
tercile of firms — is in no way applicable to a firm
like Equinor, with an average daily trading volume of NOK 900 million during the sample period.
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the order book. Increases in Idiosyncratic Volatility are associated with increases in
Illiq, as uncertainty leads to less trading. This is as expected, however, the insignificant
and negative link between changes in Volatility and changes in Illiq is surprising. The
interpretation is that the price impact is not affected by changes in the overall volatility,
when controlling for idiosyncratic volatility.
In columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.3, we use Spread as the proxy for liquidity. Overall, the
results are similar to those discovered using Illiq. In column (3), we find no significant
link between passive inflows and increases in Spread. While the coefficient is positive,
it is not significantly different from zero. As with Illiq, the coefficient is statistically
significant after the inclusion of fixed effects and control variables, and indicates that a
one percentage point increase in passive ownership is associated with an increase in a
stock’s spread of 3.1 basis points. This is equivalent to a 2.5% increase from the mean29.
This is higher than the coefficient of Israeli et al. (2017), who find a 1.6% increase from the
mean, with only a slightly lower sample mean. As illustrated in Table A2.2 in Appendix
A2, the effect is smaller for large firms (3rd tercile, column (6)), however, the differences
between the samples are not nearly as large as for the illiquidity measure. This makes
sense when considering Figure 3.4, which shows a relatively small difference between the
weighted and the arithmetic mean for the sample, meaning that the dispersion in spreads
between stocks is relatively small. For the largest tercile of firms, a one percentage point
increase in passive ownership is associated with a 2.8 bps increase in Spread.
Both changes in market capitalisation and annual volatility are as expected significantly
associated with changes in a stock’s spread. Specifically, growth in market capitalisation
of 20%30 is associated with a 4.8 basis points decrease in Spread. Further, an increase
in Volatility of 5 percentage points is associated with an increase of 3.5 basis points in
Spread. Changes in Idiosyncratic Volatility are also positively connected to changes in
Spread. The interpretations of the control variables follow the ones laid forth in relation
to the illiquidity measure.
29
The average Spread for the full sample is 125 bps.
30
Equivalent to 18% increase in the natural logarithm.
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Table 4.4: Liquidity and OSEBX Inclusion
The regressions in this table depict the effects of OSEBX inclusion on two liquidity
measures, using a Difference-in-Differences methodology. Models (2) and (4) include
control variables and fixed effects for sector and month of inclusion. DiD is a
dummy variable indicating treatment. The DiD coefficient is the effect of being
included in the OSEBX in the period from 2002 to 2019, as opposed to two control
groups of (1) similar stocks that are not included and (2) similar stocks that are
included throughout the period. The sample consists of 185/198 differences in
averages between a pre-period of two years excluding the inclusion quarter and a
post-period of two years excluding the quarter following the inclusion. Standard errors
clustered by sector and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in the parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  Illiq (%)   Spread (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD 0.060 0.137  0.060 0.066
(0.115) (0.161) (0.059) (0.057)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.076⇤⇤ 0.024⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.006)
  Log MCAP  0.434⇤⇤⇤  0.083
(0.125) (0.071)
  Volatility (%) 0.011 0.007⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.003)
  Volume (%)  1.045 0.154
(0.854) (0.185)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility  0.004 0.031⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.010)
Sector FE No Yes No Yes
Index Month FE No Yes No Yes
Treated 91 91 84 84
Control 1 54 54 50 50
Control 2 53 53 51 51
Adjusted R2  0.005 0.215  0.002 0.485
F Statistic 0.097 3.702⇤⇤⇤ 0.580 10.118⇤⇤⇤
(df = 1; 196) (df = 20; 177) (df = 1; 183) (df = 19; 165)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Findings in Quasi-Experiment (Table 4.4). Considering the results put forth in
the first part of our analysis on the link between passive ownership and liquidity, it is
important to note that correlation does not imply causation. Therefore, in this second
part, we consider OSEBX inclusions as exogenous shocks in the passive ownership of
a stock, and use these events as an independent variable in a quasi-experiment setting.
The index in question, the OSEBX, includes firms mainly based on sector and market
capitalisation (Oslo Stock Exchange, 2020). Consequently, we construct control groups
based on these two criteria, and Figure 3.3 illustrates the differences in Passive Ownership
between the groups in relation to index inclusion. We regress the differences in the average
Spread and Illiq between the pre-inclusion and post-inclusion periods for the treatment
group and the control groups. The results of the regressions are provided in Table 4.4,
where columns (2) and (4) include control variables and fixed effects for sector and month
of inclusion.
In Table 4.4, DiD is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an observation is in
the treatment group. In columns (1) and (3) we show that the treated stocks experience
increases in the illiquidity measure and decreases in the spread measure, relative to the
control groups. However, as we believe there might be other variables affecting these
proxies, we refrain from analysing these models in further detail. In column (2) and (4),
we include fixed effects for sector and month of inclusion, as well as control variables.
Now, the DiD coefficient is positive for both proxies, and corresponds roughly in size
to the Passive Ownership coefficients of the first part of the analysis when considering
the average increase in passive ownership31 and the size of the firms in the sample32.
That being said, none of the two liquidity proxies are significantly different from zero,
meaning that we can not conclude on a causal relationship. Unfortunately, the data on
index inclusions is not extensive, and a lack of observations is likely the reason why the
coefficients are not significant33. Thus, we rely on the results of our correlational study
and conclude that while we can not infer causality, there is strong evidence in our findings
of a positive relationship between a stock’s inflows of passive capital, and decreases in its
liquidity.
31
The difference in Passive Ownership between the pre-inclusion and post-inclusion periods is about 1.65
percentage points on average for the treated group.
32





full sample sorted by market capitalisation.
33
91/84 treated; 54/50 in control group 1; 53/51 in control group 2.
4.2 Main Results 55
4.2.2 H2: Passive Ownership and Price Informativeness
Main Findings (Table 4.5 - 4.8). We expect an increase in Passive Ownership to be
associated with a decline in price informativeness due to three reasons. First, a migration
of traders from the market for individual stocks to the market for indexed products would
overall imply less trading on idiosyncratic information by the aggregate market. Second, an
increase in the costs of trading is equivalent to an increase in the cost of information, which
should also lead to less informed trading. Third, we expect the firm-specific component in
prices to be negatively affected by an increase in the trading of stocks in large baskets. As
proxies for price efficiency, we use the three event-based proxies of Sammon (2020), which
relates to the reflection of earnings announcement information in stock prices. Further,
we use the R2 proxy suggested by Roll (1988) and formalised by Durnev et al. (2003),
which relates to the synchronicity of stock returns.
With the event-based proxies in Table 4.5, we find ambiguous results. On the one hand,
we document a significant relationship between increases in passive ownership and less
pre-earnings trading (CAV ), which is consistent with Sammon (2020) and indicates a
decrease in the overall efforts of the market to trade on information in the pre-earnings
period. On the other hand, we find neither a significant decrease in the pre-earning drift
(DM ) nor an increase in the volatility on earnings announcement days (QVS ), which
would be expected had the pre-earnings price efficiency dropped. These interpretations
are robust to using different samples, as reported in Tables A2.3, A2.4 and A2.5 in the
Appendices. In the quasi-experiment in Table 4.7, we document a significant decrease in
the pre-earnings trading but find no such evidence for the other two proxies.
When using the R2 (Synch) proxy in Table 4.6, we find a significant relationship between
a stock’s increases in Passive Ownership and increases in its returns’ synchronicity with
those of the market and its sector. In Tables A2.6 and A7.1 in the Appendices, we
show that the effect is smaller for larger stocks. The directionality of the relationship is
consistent with the existing literature but the effect seems smaller in our sample. One
possibility is that the difference could be caused by the different types of passive vehicles
analysed. In the second part of the analysis, we document a significant causal relationship.
However, we believe that we might fail to control for increases in Synch at index inclusions







Table 4.5: Price Informativeness and Passive Ownership
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in three price efficiency proxies and changes in passive
ownership. The sample consists of 153 or 172 stocks and 3,354 or 4,117 stock-year-quarter observations in the period from 2000 to
2020. Models (2), (4) and (6) include control variables and fixed effects for stock and year-quarter, while models (1), (3) and
(5) include no such elements. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
Corresponding tables with the same models run on different subsamples are provided in Tables A2.3, A2.4 and A2.5 in the
Appendices.
Dependent variable:
  CAV   DM   QVS (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  Passive Ownership (%)  0.780⇤⇤⇤  0.853⇤⇤⇤  0.0001  0.0002  0.010 0.060
(0.238) (0.223) (0.001) (0.001) (0.166) (0.149)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.002 0.0002  0.239⇤⇤⇤
(0.201) (0.001) (0.087)
  Log MCAP 1.887⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.324
(0.732) (0.002) (0.264)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.132⇤⇤ 0.010⇤  0.378
(1.886) (0.005) (0.457)
  Beta  4.375⇤⇤⇤  0.003  0.021
(1.067) (0.003) (0.468)
Stock FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
YearQuarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,116 4,116 4,117 4,117 3,354 3,354
Adjusted R2  0.042  0.055  0.044  0.056  0.048  0.071
F Statistic 7.088⇤⇤⇤ 8.466⇤⇤⇤ 0.035 7.664⇤⇤⇤ 0.005 2.150⇤
(df = 1; 3943) (df = 5; 3859) (df = 1; 3944) (df = 5; 3860) (df = 1; 3200) (df = 5; 3119)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Return Synchronicity and Passive Ownership
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes a return synchronicity
measure and changes in passive ownership. The sample consists of 197 stocks and
1,882 stock-year observations in the period from 2000 to 2020. Models (2) and (4)
include control variables and fixed effects for stock and year, while models (1) and
(3) include no such elements. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to
heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses. Corresponding tables with the same




  Passive Ownership (%) 0.080⇤⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.014)
  Active Ownership (%) 0.005
(0.010)




Stock FE No Yes
Year FE No Yes
Observations 1,882 1,882
Adjusted R2  0.112 0.267
F Statistic 8.036⇤⇤⇤ (df = 1; 1684) 225.705⇤⇤⇤ (df = 4; 1662)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
58 4.2 Main Results
Findings in Correlational Study (Table 4.5 - 4.6). The results of our regressions
using the event-based proxies and the synchronicity proxy are provided in Tables 4.5 and
4.6, respectively. For all proxies, the first column provides the relationship without control
variables nor fixed effects, while the second column includes these elements. First, we
interpret the results of the regressions on the event-based proxies.
The first proxy is the pre-earnings volume (CAV ). Column (1) in Table 4.5 shows that
changes in a stock’s passive ownership are negatively associated with changes in abnormal
trading volume in the month leading up to its earnings announcements. In column (2),
the coefficient is slightly larger, suggesting that a one percentage point increase in Passive
Ownership is associated with a 3.7% decrease in CAV. This is equivalent to a loss of 0.85
trading days of volume during the 22-day estimation window. The directionality of our
coefficient is consistent with the findings of (Sammon, 2020) on U.S. stocks, however, the
coefficient itself is about twice as large. Table A2.3 in the Appendices shows that the
effect is smaller for the largest tercile of stocks, indicating a loss of 0.54 trading days.
Further, growth in market capitalisation is associated with more pre-earnings trading.
This could be explained by the tendency of growing firms to experience an increased
interest from analysts and the market as a whole. This means that the efforts of the
market to analyse information ahead of the announcement intensify as firms grow. Positive
changes in Beta are associated with a decrease in CAV, which could be caused by the
overall market focusing less on firm-specific information and more on macroeconomic
factors. The opposite interpretation is assumed for the positive coefficient of changes in
Idiosyncratic Volatility.
The second proxy is the drift measure (DM ) used in column (3) and (4) of Table 4.5. This
is the ratio of the return in the month of the announcement excluding the announcement
day, to the total return of the period including the announcement day34. Consequently, it
measures the extent to which the information presented was embedded in the price during
the month leading up to the announcement. Column (3) and (4) show a negative, but
small and insignificant relationship between changes in Passive Ownership and changes in
DM. Therefore, we have no indication of a relationship between the two variables. Despite
this, we do find a significant relationship between increases in Log MCAP and increases
34
For announcements with negative returns, the ratio is inverted, in order for the interpretation of the
variable to remain the same (lower values of DM indicate less informative prices and conversely).
4.2 Main Results 59
in DM. The reason for this relationship is likely similar to the interpretation for CAV,
i.e., that when firms grow their performance is increasingly analysed by various market
participants.
The third measure is the earnings announcement day’s share of the quarterly volatility
of a stock (QVS ). This measure builds on the two previous ones. That is, with less
informative prices in the period leading up to the announcement, we would expect more
volatility on the announcement day. The results are provided in column (5) and (6) of
Table 4.5. The coefficient of 0.06 indicates that an increase of one percentage point in
Passive Ownership is associated with an increase of 0.06 percentage points in QVS. This
is an increase of about 1% relative to the sample mean of 6.12%. However, the effect is
not significant at any of the cut-off levels. For this particular measure, changes in Active
Ownership is significantly associated to changes price informativeness, and exhibits a
negative coefficient. The explanation for such a relationship could be that sophisticated
active investors rather trade on privately gathered information prior to the announcement
than on the specific announcement day.
The fourth proxy of price informativeness relates to the comovement of a stock’s returns
to that of the market and its sector. As prices contain less firm-specific information, the
correlation with its sector and the market increases (Roll, 1988). Durnev et al. (2003)
find that stocks with low return correlations with the market and its sector display higher
correlation with future earnings. We follow Durnev et al. (2003) and use as our fourth
measure the transformed R2 of a market model regression, as described in Equation 3.7,
with sector and market returns as explanatory variables for individual stock returns.
The results from the regressions on the synchronicity measure are illustrated in Table
4.6. In column (1), we run the regression without fixed effects and control variables. We
document a positive relationship between increases in Synch and inflows into passive
vehicles. The relationship is significant at the 1% level. When including control variables
and fixed effects in column (2), the coefficient decreases in size but remains significant at
the same level. Changes in Log MCAP is an important control variable, as growing firms
constitute a growing share of the total market and their sectors, intuitively resulting in a
larger R2 in the regression model upon which the synchronicity measure is based. Further,
we find no significant relationship between increases in Synch and increases in the Active
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Ownership. This suggests that the relationship of fund ownership with changes in Synch
is mainly related to passive investing. Lastly, we control for changes in Beta, essentially
allowing for stocks with high betas to move more in tandem with the market (Li et al.,
2014). The positive association between changes in Beta and changes in Synch is not
surprising and highly significant. Controlling for these effects, we find that a 1 percentage
point increase in Passive Ownership is associated with a 0.039 increase in Synch. This is
equivalent to an increase of about 0.4 percentage points in the R2 of the market model
regression. In Table A2.6, the coefficient for the sample of large stocks is about 1/3 of
that in the full sample. Despite this, the effects are only slightly smaller for the largest
tercile of firms. This is due to a non-linear relationship between the synchronicity measure
and the R2 from the regression35.
In line with our hypothesis, these results indicate that an increase in passive ownership is
associated with a decrease in the firm-specific information component in a stock’s price.
Such a relationship is economically significant in several ways. First, it implies that there
could be a link between increases in passive investing and a less functioning market, i.e., a
market in which capital is not efficiently allocated between firms. Second, a market with
less firm-specific information is equivalent to a more risky market for investors, as the
effects of diversification would be expected to decrease as stocks move more in tandem
with the market. In Table A5.1 in the Appendices, we document a significant relationship
between increases in a stock’s passive ownership and increases in its equally-weighted
correlation with other stocks. That being said, less informationally efficient prices should
also create opportunities for active investors, as the benefits of trading on firm-specific
information should increase as fewer investors choose to do so. If index investors end up
holding more and more misvalued stocks, active managers should focus on identifying
these stocks with misvalued fundamentals, instead of attempting to mimic the index
strategy (also referred to as "closet indexing"). By profiting from such inefficiencies, the
active style should increase in popularity, and the aggregate market should at some point
in the future reach an equilibrium where prices are just sufficiently inefficient for the two
styles to coexist (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2018).
35
The coefficient of 0.014 for the largest tercile indicates an increase in the R
2
of about 0.3 percentage
points. The reason for the different interpretation is that the largest stocks have a higher mean of Synch.
An increase in Synch from a higher level is equivalent to a larger increase in the R
2
. The relationship
between changes in R
2
and changes in Synch is illustrated in Table A7.1 in the Appendices.
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A potentially omitted variable in the relationship could be the aggregate market’s emphasis
on systematic, rather than idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, the rise in passive investing could
be caused by the market deeming systematic factors more important than idiosyncratic
factors. In this case, our findings would be expected, but our second hypothesis would
still be wrong. This would essentially imply that despite the indications of the existing
literature (Bramante et al., 2015; Durnev et al., 2003; Roll, 1988), increases in R2 is not
equivalent to a decrease in price efficiency. In Figure A6.1 in the Appendices, we segment
overall volatility into three component parts: (1) market-specific, (2) sector-specific and
(3) firm-specific volatility, using the methodology of Campbell et al. (2001). We do not
identify trends confirming either a decrease in idiosyncratic volatility or an increase in
systematic volatility. Consequently, we believe that a shift in the market’s focus on
systematic information seems unlikely. Furthermore, we believe that such an effect caused
by passive investing is unlikely in the Norwegian market, considering the relatively limited







Table 4.7: Price Informativeness and OSEBX Inclusion
The regressions in this table depict the effects of OSEBX inclusion on three event-based measures, using a Difference-
in-Differences methodology. Models (2), (4) and (6) include control variables and fixed effects for sector and month
of inclusion. DiD is a dummy variable indicating treatment. The DiD coefficient is the effect of being included in the
OSEBX in the period from 2003 to 2019, as opposed to two control groups of (1) similar stocks that are not included and
(2) similar stocks that are included throughout the period. The sample consists of 120 differences in averages between a
pre-period of two years excluding the inclusion quarter and a post-period of two years excluding the quarter following the
inclusion. Standard errors clustered by sector and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in the parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  CAV   DM   QVS (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD  2.113  2.248⇤ 0.011 0.011 0.409 0.769
(1.869) (1.321) (0.008) (0.010) (0.943) (0.651)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.101  0.001 0.384⇤⇤⇤
(0.370) (0.001) (0.080)
  Log MCAP 1.546 0.004 0.620⇤⇤⇤
(1.587) (0.012) (0.191)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.781⇤⇤⇤  0.002 0.171
(0.485) (0.003) (0.252)
  Beta 1.977  0.028⇤⇤ 1.968
(2.202) (0.011) (2.054)
Sector FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Index Month FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Treated 51 51 51 51 51 51
Control 1 28 28 28 28 28 28
Control 2 41 41 41 41 41 41
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.090 0.013 0.216  0.007 0.126
F Statistic 2.577 1.732⇤ 2.614 3.054⇤⇤⇤ 0.196 2.071⇤⇤
(df = 1; 118) (df = 16; 103) (df = 1; 118) (df = 16; 103) (df = 1; 118) (df = 16; 103)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Return Synchronicity and OSEBX Inclusion
The regressions in this table depict the effects of OSEBX inclusion on a return
synchronicity measure, using a Difference-in-Differences methodology. Models (2)
and (4) include control variables and fixed effects for sector and month of inclusion.
DiD is a dummy variable indicating treatment. The DiD coefficient is the effect
of being included in the OSEBX in the period from 2002 to 2019, as opposed to
two control groups of (1) similar stocks that are not included and (2) similar stocks
that are included throughout the period. The sample consists of 197 differences in
averages between a pre-period of two years excluding the inclusion quarter and a
post-period of two years excluding the quarter following the inclusion. Standard errors






  Active Ownership (%) 0.036⇤⇤
(0.015)




Sector FE No Yes
Index Month FE No Yes
Treated 90 90
Control 1 54 54
Control 2 53 53
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.504
F Statistic 15.261⇤⇤⇤ (df = 1; 195) 12.077⇤⇤⇤ (df = 18; 178)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Findings in Quasi-Experiment (Table 4.7 - 4.8). Using the same specifications as
previously, we regress changes in the event-based proxies and the synchronicity measure on
the treatment dummy indicating whether or not the stock has been added to the OSEBX.
The results of the regressions are provided in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, respectively. Both the
models using CAV and QVS as proxies display larger coefficients, however, in the same
direction as in the correlational analyses. The reason could be that we underestimate
the true increase in passive ownership, and that index inclusions also lead to increases in
the investments of implicit indexers, as discussed in Section 2.3.2. Column (2) indicates
a significant relationship between quasi-exogenous increases in passive ownership and
decreases in CAV. More specifically, the increase in passive ownership induced by OSEBX
inclusion leads to a decrease in the pre-earnings trading volume equivalent to 2.25 normal
trading days. The coefficient for DM, on the other hand, now has a positive sign. This is
not expected, as it indicates that the effect of index inclusion is a more precise incorporation
of information prior to the announcement. This relationship could for instance be caused
by increases in the number of analyst covering a firm after inclusion, which we do not
control for. We emphasise that neither the drift measure nor the quadratic variation share
provides statistically significant results, making the interpretation uncertain.
One explanation for the differences between our results and the ones of Sammon (2020)
could be that index investing in Norway is still too limited for us to document similar
effects to those in the U.S. market. Despite this, our regressions on liquidity strongly
suggest a correlation between increases in Passive Ownership and reductions in liquidity.
Consequently, the question becomes whether or not there is a link between liquidity
and price efficiency. Either no such link exists, or there are structural differences in
earnings announcements between the two countries making these measures less credible
for Norwegian stocks. For instance, we note that both the average drift and pre-earnings
trading in U.S. stocks are higher than for Norwegian stocks, indicating that U.S. stock
prices are more informative. At the same time, the QVS of U.S. stocks is higher than
that of Norwegian stocks, indicating the contrary. Adding to this, as discussed in Section
4.1, the correlations between the proxies themselves also indicate inconsistencies.
Lastly, we apply our quasi-experiment setting to the synchronicity measure. As illustrated
in Table 4.8, the results are larger than reported in the correlational analysis. In column
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(1), we find a significant and positive relationship between DiD and changes in Synch.
We exclude the quarter of inclusion and the subsequent quarter, in order to limit index
inclusion effects. However, as we know from the literature, there is likely a positive return
effect from being included in an index (Petajisto, 2011). If the higher level of Log MCAP is
sustained beyond the excluded quarters, changes in Log MCAP becomes a crucial control
variable. This is because growing firms constitute a growing part of both the market
and the sector. We also control for active ownership, as many active investors could
have mandates restricting investments outside the OSEBX. Lastly, we control for changes
in Beta, following the arguments laid forth in the correlational analysis. By controlling
for these effects, the DiD coefficient is significant at the 5% level and indicates that the
increase in passive ownership from OSEBX inclusion leads to an increase in Synch of 0.319.
This is equivalent to an increase in the market model R2 of 3.5 percentage points from the
mean, which is substantially higher than in the correlational analysis when accounting for
the 1.65 percentage points average increase in passive ownership at inclusion.
There are two possible explanations for this. First, our proxy for passive ownership could
underestimate the true increase in passive ownership at index inclusions. This is likely
not the only reason, as the deviations in our other analyses are considerably smaller. A
second reason is that there could be other factors than passive investing affecting the
synchronicity at inclusions. On the one hand, the traditional view is that comovement
within indices is a result of comovement in fundamental factors. In this view, synchronicity
in indices could stem from factors such as more synchronised discount rates being applied
to index constituents. On the other hand, a more novel view proposed by Barberis et al.
(2005)36 is that comovement occurs as a result of trading commonality, as specific indices
serve as the preferred habitat for certain investors, and that some investment products are
linked to specific indices. This relates to passive investing, but also to other investors with
the OSEBX as their preferred habitat. Consequently, we can not infer with certainty that
passive investing is the only reason for the increase in return synchronicity at inclusion.
We believe that the trading of passive investors causes a great deal of the synchronicity
induced by index inclusion. However, we acknowledge that other unobserved factors might
interfere with our interpretation in the quasi-experiment setting. On the basis of this, we
can not unreservedly infer a causal relationship.
36
This is referred to as the "habitat" view of comovement.
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5 Conclusions
In this final chapter, we first provide our conclusions. Second, we emphasise the most
important limitations of our analyses and findings. Lastly, we provide a few suggestions
for future research on the impact of passive investing.
5.1 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the impact of passive investing on the liquidity
and price efficiency of Norwegian stocks. First, we posit that passive ownership has a
negative influence on liquidity, as more shares are held in long-term deposits and more
trading is based on price-inelastic demand. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
H1: “Does passive investing lead to reduced liquidity in the Norwegian stock
market?”
The results of our analyses on the first hypothesis indicate a significant relationship
between increases in the passive ownership of a stock, and decreases in its liquidity. The
relationship is robust to using various subsamples, however, the effect seems stronger
for the stocks of smaller firms. In general, our findings are consistent with the existing
literature, which is exclusively conducted on ETFs in the U.S. (Hamm, 2014; Israeli et al.,
2017). That being said, the negative effect of passive ownership on liquidity seems larger
in Norway. This could be due to the low free float in Norwegian stocks, or that the passive
vehicles present in Norwegian stocks trade less frequently37.
Further, we claim that the negative impact on liquidity might lead to less trading by
informed investors, and thus, less informative prices. Basket trading by index funds and
ETFs could amplify this effect. Our second hypothesis is stated as follows:
H2: “Does passive investing lead to less informative prices in the Norwegian
stock market?”
In our analyses on the second hypothesis, we use two different types of proxies for price
informativeness. With proxies related to earnings announcements, we find somewhat mixed
results. Utilising more data through the fourth proxy, we find a statistically significant
37
In the Norwegian market, ETFs constitute a relatively small part of the total passive ownership.
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relationship between increases in passive ownership and decreases in the firm-specific
information component of stock prices. This finding is consistent with less trading on
idiosyncratic information by informed market participants, with the result being less
informative prices. While the directionality of our findings is consistent with the existing
literature (Israeli et al., 2017; Sammon, 2020; Qin and Singal, 2015), it seems the negative
effect of passive ownership on price efficiency is smaller in Norwegian stocks. This could
indicate that the passive investor’s trading of stocks in baskets is a more important channel
in terms of impact on price efficiency than the long-term holding of shares38.
In the analysis on liquidity, we fail to establish causality using index inclusions as quasi-
exogenous shocks in passive ownership. While the coefficients and their signs were similar
to those in the correlational analyses, they were consistently insignificant, likely due
to a limited number of observations. Consequently, we are not able to conclude on a
cause-effect relationship. In the analyses on price efficiency, we document a significant
relationship between index inclusions and increases in return synchronicity. Still, we can
not unreservedly infer causality between increases in passive investing and decreases in
synchronicity, as we suspect there might be unobservable factors interfering with the
relationship.
That being said, we believe our findings are of relevance for both passive and active
investors, regulators and commentators. Passive investing is largely based on the notion
that prices are efficient due to the efforts of active investors, and that passive vehicles
do not affect the markets in which they act. Active investors provide liquidity and
contribute to price efficiency directly through their trading. Passive investors, on the
other hand, remove liquidity and do not contribute to making prices efficient. This thesis
provides empirical evidence of both these externalities of passive investing. As passive
investing continues to gain popularity, these negative externalities will continue to affect
the structure of the stock market. Inevitably, we believe this will lead to opportunities
emerging for active investors, and that there is some form of equilibrium level of efficiency
where both styles can coexist and profit.
38
In general, index ETFs are associated with more trading and less long-term holding of shares, relative
to index mutual funds and the FTF.
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5.2 Limitations
In the following sections, we discuss the limitations of our thesis, and how these might
affect our findings and conclusions.
First of all, there are a few limitations to our samples. The Oslo Stock Exchange is
relatively small with an average of 221 stocks listed during our sample period. Further,
our fund ownership data only allows for the analysis of currently listed stocks. While
we do not believe that this leads to a biased sample, it severely reduces the number of
observations. After excluding observations of stocks with a market capitalisation below
$27.8 million39, the final sample is small relative to comparable studies conducted on U.S.
stocks40. This becomes especially problematic in the quasi-experiment, and we believe
that the size of our sample is the primary reason for our inability to establish causality.
We deem the full sample sufficiently large, however, it contains stocks that deviate greatly
from one another in factors such as size, liquidity, volatility and passive ownership. Ideally,
a larger sample could have allowed for analyses conducted on more specific subsamples,
which in turn could have led to a more in-depth understanding of the many mechanisms
in play.
Further, we are unable to analyse the directionality of the proposed mispricing introduced
by passive ownership and trading. This is mainly due to a lack of easily accessible and
complete accounting data for Norwegian stocks. Durnev et al. (2003) show that stocks
with a low market model R2 have a higher R2 in a model where stock returns are explained
by future earnings. We are unable to test this due to the absence of accounting data and
must therefore rely on the findings of the existing literature.
There are also a few limitations to our passive ownership proxy. Several studies have
indicated that many active managers follow a strategy similar to that of index funds, but
with a small number of active bets (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Thoresen and Øren,
2017). Moreover, there is no reason to believe that other institutional investors have not
also tilted towards index investing in recent years. We fail to account for such implicit
indexing in our analysis, which means that our specific findings may not be generalisable to
39
$27.8 million is equal to NOK 250 million at a USDNOK of 9.00.
40
After excluding both delisted stocks and stocks with a market capitalisation below $27.8 million, our
final sample consists of 121 stocks on average.
5.3 Proposals for Future Research 69
the true increase in passive ownership. In addition to this, we measure passive ownership
as the number of shares held by passive funds over the total number of shares outstanding.
In our analysis on liquidity, we would ideally have used the free float as the denominator.
The implication is that we are likely to underestimate the effects of passive investing on
liquidity in stocks with a below-average free float share, and conversely.
Lastly, in the quasi-experiment, there are always concerns regarding violations of underlying
assumptions. For our analyses, this mainly relates to index inclusion effects. Specifically, if
other index inclusion effects than increases in passive ownership are affecting our dependent
variables, we could find biased estimates. In order to deal with this, we include control
variables nominated by both the literature on our dependent variables and on index
inclusion effects in general. Further, we exclude both the quarter of inclusion and the
subsequent quarter. However, we acknowledge that there might still be other effects
arising from index inclusions that we fail to control for.
5.3 Proposals for Future Research
We encourage more research on the impacts of passive investing in global equity markets.
That being said, passive investing is also becoming more prevalent in fixed income
markets41. There is limited research conducted on the role of the passive investor in such
markets. Bond indices are also capitalisation-weighted, meaning that passive investors are
more exposed to the most indebted firms. Further, we believe the incentive mechanisms of
passive inflows in bonds are interesting, and could serve as the topic for future research.
We also encourage more research on the impacts of passive investing in the Norwegian
equity market. The inclusion of accounting data could allow for analyses on valuations.
For instance, one could ask whether or not the flows from passive investors, given that
they are based on non-fundamental factors, are associated with inflated prices over some
term. This could provide further insights into the efficiency of the market in light of
the ongoing shift from active to passive investing. That being said, we emphasise that
analyses on the Norwegian market will likely benefit from longer time series and larger
passive ownership shares, meaning that researchers should consider waiting a few years
41
To our knowledge, this trend is not present in the Norwegian bond market, mainly due to liquidity and
transparency reasons.
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before conducting their analyses.
Lastly, researchers could examine a possible equilibrium between passive and active
investment styles, with the potential impacts of passive investing in mind. We believe
that passive investing could become overcrowded at some point in the future, and that
this will lead to opportunities of higher returns for active managers. The when and the
how of such a turning point could be an interesting topic for financial researchers.
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Table A1.1: Variable Definitions
This table provides the definitions of all variables utilised in this paper.
Variable Definition
Passive Ownershipi,t = The number of shares of stock i held by passive funds at
time t divided by the total number of shares outstanding of
stock i at time t. Expressed in percentage points.







max (E[(ci,t   ⌘i,t)(ci,t   ⌘i,t+1)], 0), where ci,t is
the daily closing log-price, ⌘i,t is the mean of the daily high
and low log-prices and Ni is the number of daily observations
for stock i in month m. Monthly averages are used to
mitigate the effect of negative roots and to achieve the most
accurate estimate. Expressed in percentage points.
Illiqi,t = The Amihud illiquidity measure for stock i at time t, defined
as |returni,t|
turnoveri,t
, where | returni,t | is the absolute return of stock
i on day t, while turnoveri,t is the trading volume of stock i
on day t in NOK millions. Expressed in percentage points.
CAVi,t = The cumulative abnormal volume in relation to an earnings









, where Vi,t is the NOK trading
volume for stock i at day t.
DMi,t = The drift measure in relation to an earnings
















, if ri,T < 0
, where ri,t is the return on stock
i on day t in the period leading up the announcement day,
while ri,T is the return on the announcement day.
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Variable Definition
QVSi,t = The quadratic variation share in relation to an earnings









are the squared return of stock i at earnings
announcement day T and r2
i,t
is the return of stock i at
day t in quarter T . Expressed in percentage points.
Synchi,t = The return synchronicity for stock i at time t, defined
as the adjusted R2 in: reti,t =  1 ⇤ retOSEBX,t +  2 ⇤
retOSEBX,t 1 +  3 ⇤ retSEC,t +  4 ⇤ retSEC,t 1 + ✏, where
reti,d, retOSEBX and retSEC,d is the return at time t of
stock, OSEBX and the stock’s sector. The adjusted R2







Active Ownershipi,t = The number of shares of stock i held by active funds at
time t divided by the total number of shares outstanding
of stock i at time t. Expressed in percentage points.
Log MCAPi,t = The natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of
stock i at time t.
Volatilityi,t = The annualised standard deviation of returns for stock i
at time t. Expressed in percentage points.
Volumei,t = The daily trading volume, defined as shares traded
divided by shares outstanding for stock i at time t.
Expressed in percentage points.
Idiosyncratic Volatilityi,t = The idiosyncratic volatility of stock i at time t, defined
as: (reti,t   retOSEBX,t)2, where reti,t and retOSEBX,t is
the daily return of stock i and OSEBX at time t.
Betai,t = The beta of stock i at time t, defined as the covariance
between stock i and OSEBX returns, divided by the
variance of the OSEBX returns.
DiDi,t = A dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is included in
OSEBX at time t and 0 otherwise.
  = The change operator, Yt less Yt 1 for annual samples









Table A2.1: Robustness Analysis for Illiquidity Measure
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in illiquidity (Illiq) and changes in passive ownership for different
subsamples. Model (1) is the full sample; Model (2) includes observations of stocks in the OSEBX; Model (3) includes observations
of stock not in the OSEBX; Models (4), (5) and (6) include observations of stocks in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tercile based on market
capitalisation, respectively; Model (7) includes observations of stock with a non-zero passive ownership. Across all models, fixed effects
for stock and year are included. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  Illiq (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Passive Ownership (%) 0.092⇤ 0.014 1.021 1.859  0.076 0.027⇤⇤ 0.007
(0.052) (0.011) (0.723) (5.640) (0.109) (0.011) (0.011)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.217⇤⇤⇤ 0.002  0.707⇤⇤⇤  1.348⇤⇤  0.179⇤⇤  0.011  0.026⇤
(0.078) (0.006) (0.237) (0.599) (0.086) (0.009) (0.014)
  Log MCAP  1.797⇤⇤⇤  0.102⇤⇤⇤  3.553⇤⇤⇤  4.250⇤⇤⇤  1.608⇤⇤⇤  0.251⇤⇤⇤  0.339⇤⇤⇤
(0.455) (0.037) (0.795) (1.316) (0.606) (0.075) (0.100)
  Volatility (%)  0.037  0.004  0.054  0.083 0.015 0.006  0.006
(0.025) (0.003) (0.042) (0.063) (0.027) (0.005) (0.007)
  Volume (%)  3.105⇤⇤⇤  0.296⇤⇤⇤  4.935⇤⇤⇤  4.155⇤⇤⇤  1.296⇤⇤⇤  0.317⇤⇤⇤  0.648⇤⇤⇤
(0.732) (0.085) (1.123) (1.274) (0.417) (0.108) (0.133)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.855⇤⇤ 0.475⇤⇤ 2.084⇤ 1.622 0.177 0.414 0.646⇤⇤
(0.819) (0.223) (1.242) (1.314) (0.764) (0.312) (0.255)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full OSEBX Not OSEBX MCAP 1 MCAP 2 MCAP 3 Passive
Observations 2,196 763 1,255 699 735 762 1,089
Adjusted R2  0.079  0.104  0.124  0.216  0.277  0.120  0.080
F Statistic 12.505⇤⇤⇤ 6.989⇤⇤⇤ 10.169⇤⇤⇤ 4.820⇤⇤⇤ 2.764⇤⇤ 6.540⇤⇤⇤ 12.417⇤⇤⇤










Table A2.2: Robustness Analysis for Spread Measure
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in spread and changes in passive ownership for different
subsamples. Model (1) is the full sample; Model (2) includes observations of stocks in the OSEBX; Model (3) includes observations
of stock not in the OSEBX; Models (4), (5) and (6) include observations of stocks in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tercile based on market
capitalisation, respectively; Model (7) includes observations of stock with a non-zero passive ownership. Across all models, fixed effects
for stock and year are included. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  Spread (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Passive Ownership (%) 0.031⇤⇤ 0.030⇤⇤ 0.034 0.122 0.039 0.028⇤⇤ 0.029⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.013) (0.090) (0.791) (0.044) (0.012) (0.012)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.013  0.006  0.013  0.071⇤  0.002  0.004  0.005
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.042) (0.021) (0.010) (0.009)
  Log MCAP  0.269⇤⇤⇤  0.144⇤⇤  0.354⇤⇤⇤ 0.157  0.493⇤⇤⇤  0.185⇤⇤⇤  0.245⇤⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.071) (0.077) (0.148) (0.096) (0.057) (0.061)
  Volatility (%) 0.007⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.006 0.002 0.023⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
  Volume (%)  0.132  0.114  0.058  0.255⇤ 0.057  0.131  0.152
(0.081) (0.116) (0.131) (0.148) (0.178) (0.130) (0.133)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.542⇤⇤⇤ 0.190 0.665⇤⇤⇤ 0.631⇤⇤⇤ 0.098  0.283 0.049
(0.138) (0.216) (0.195) (0.167) (0.247) (0.415) (0.264)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full OSEBX Not OSEBX MCAP 1 MCAP 2 MCAP 3 Passive
Observations 2,196 763 1,255 699 735 762 1,089
Adjusted R2  0.045  0.109  0.103  0.202  0.152  0.116  0.090
F Statistic 23.325⇤⇤⇤ 6.475⇤⇤⇤ 13.724⇤⇤⇤ 5.964⇤⇤⇤ 13.152⇤⇤⇤ 6.969⇤⇤⇤ 10.932⇤⇤⇤










Table A2.3: Robustness Analysis for CAV Measure
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) and changes in passive
ownership for different subsamples. Model (1) is the full sample; Model (2) includes observations of stocks in the OSEBX; Model (3) includes
observations of stock not in the OSEBX; Models (4), (5) and (6) include observations of stocks in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tercile based on market
capitalisation, respectively; Model (7) includes observations of stock with a non-zero passive ownership. Across all models, fixed effects for
stock and year-quarter are included. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  CAV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Passive Ownership (%)  0.853⇤⇤⇤  0.770⇤⇤⇤  0.682  2.996  0.714⇤⇤⇤  0.540⇤⇤  0.763⇤⇤⇤
(0.223) (0.204) (1.108) (2.325) (0.268) (0.245) (0.218)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.002  0.027 0.022  0.423 0.300 0.127 0.120
(0.201) (0.188) (0.471) (0.577) (0.290) (0.170) (0.204)
  Log MCAP 1.887⇤⇤⇤ 2.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.570 2.308 2.019 2.239⇤⇤ 3.151⇤⇤⇤
(0.732) (0.719) (1.389) (1.552) (1.355) (0.971) (0.932)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.132⇤⇤ 5.466⇤ 3.820 1.880 6.087⇤ 5.613 11.404⇤⇤⇤
(1.886) (2.897) (2.737) (2.153) (3.435) (6.603) (3.354)
  Beta  4.375⇤⇤⇤  1.982  7.753⇤⇤⇤  8.918⇤⇤⇤  3.438⇤⇤  1.984  3.357⇤⇤⇤
(1.067) (1.413) (1.773) (1.950) (1.633) (1.404) (1.123)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearQuarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full OSEBX Not OSEBX MCAP 1 MCAP 2 MCAP 3 Passive
Observations 4,116 2,328 1,788 1,372 1,370 1,374 2,606
Adjusted R2  0.055  0.063  0.126  0.145  0.134  0.104  0.054
F Statistic 8.466⇤⇤⇤ 5.165⇤⇤⇤ 3.917⇤⇤⇤ 3.762⇤⇤⇤ 2.504⇤⇤ 2.834⇤⇤ 11.055⇤⇤⇤










Table A2.4: Robustness Analysis for DM Measure
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in drift measure (DM) and changes in passive ownership for different
subsamples. Model (1) is the full sample; Model (2) includes observations of stocks in the OSEBX; Model (3) includes observations
of stock not in the OSEBX; Models (4), (5) and (6) include observations of stocks in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tercile based on market
capitalisation, respectively; Model (7) includes observations of stock with a non-zero passive ownership. Across all models, fixed effects for
stock and year-quarter are included. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  DM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Passive Ownership (%)  0.0002  0.0002 0.002  0.011⇤⇤  0.00000 0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  Active Ownership (%) 0.0002 0.001  0.0002  0.0004 0.0003 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  Log MCAP 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.009⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤ 0.008⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.010⇤ 0.017⇤⇤ 0.010 0.008⇤ 0.007 0.032 0.031⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.027) (0.012)
  Beta  0.003 0.006  0.013⇤⇤⇤  0.006  0.004 0.006 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearQuarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full OSEBX Not OSEBX MCAP 1 MCAP 2 MCAP 3 Passive
Observations 4,117 2,328 1,789 1,373 1,370 1,374 2,606
Adjusted R2  0.056  0.062  0.123  0.150  0.137  0.103  0.058
F Statistic 7.664⇤⇤⇤ 5.468⇤⇤⇤ 4.736⇤⇤⇤ 2.526⇤⇤ 1.747 2.848⇤⇤ 9.019⇤⇤⇤










Table A2.5: Robustness Analysis for QVS Measure
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in quadratic variation share (QVS) and changes in passive ownership
for different subsamples. Model (1) is the full sample; Model (2) includes observations of stocks in the OSEBX; Model (3) includes
observations of stock not in the OSEBX; Models (4), (5) and (6) include observations of stocks in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tercile based on market
capitalisation, respectively; Model (7) includes observations of stock with a non-zero passive ownership. Across all models, fixed effects for
stock and year-quarter are included. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  QVS (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Passive Ownership (%) 0.060 0.105  0.355 0.472 0.041  0.103 0.037
(0.149) (0.162) (0.429) (0.535) (0.175) (0.212) (0.144)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.239⇤⇤⇤  0.166  0.398⇤⇤  0.201  0.117  0.292⇤⇤  0.273⇤⇤⇤
(0.087) (0.116) (0.169) (0.146) (0.183) (0.136) (0.100)
  Log MCAP 0.324 0.584 0.326 0.528 0.596 0.594 0.316
(0.264) (0.419) (0.336) (0.379) (0.549) (0.907) (0.402)
  Idiosyncratic Volatility  0.378  0.757  0.408  0.120  1.065  7.224⇤⇤  2.232⇤⇤
(0.457) (0.746) (0.602) (0.304) (1.396) (3.113) (0.975)
  Beta  0.021  0.560 0.908  0.597 0.971 0.119  0.245
(0.468) (0.557) (0.698) (0.705) (0.960) (0.770) (0.646)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearQuarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full OSEBX Not OSEBX MCAP 1 MCAP 2 MCAP 3 Passive
Observations 3,354 2,034 1,320 977 1,132 1,245 2,233
Adjusted R2  0.071  0.081  0.162  0.209  0.161  0.115  0.078
F Statistic 2.150⇤ 1.179 2.272⇤⇤ 1.048 0.859 1.403 2.219⇤⇤










Table A2.6: Robustness Analysis for Synchronicity Measure
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in return synchronicity (Synch) and changes in return synchronicity
for different subsamples. Model (1) is the full sample; Model (2) includes observations of stocks in the OSEBX; Model (3) includes
observations of stock not in the OSEBX; Models (4), (5) and (6) include observations of stocks in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tercile based
on market capitalisation, respectively; Model (7) includes observations of stock with a non-zero passive ownership. Across all models,
fixed effects for stocks and year are included. Standard errors clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
  Synch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Passive Ownership (%) 0.039⇤⇤⇤ 0.023⇤ 0.001 0.170 0.071⇤ 0.014 0.028⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.013) (0.088) (0.191) (0.038) (0.012) (0.012)
  Active Ownership (%) 0.005  0.006  0.004 0.013 0.023  0.009 0.009
(0.010) (0.007) (0.022) (0.040) (0.020) (0.008) (0.007)
  Log MCAP 0.251⇤⇤⇤ 0.256⇤⇤⇤ 0.197⇤ 0.243⇤ 0.295⇤⇤ 0.117⇤ 0.251⇤⇤⇤
(0.062) (0.062) (0.102) (0.141) (0.118) (0.065) (0.058)
  Beta 2.074⇤⇤⇤ 1.360⇤⇤⇤ 2.692⇤⇤⇤ 2.389⇤⇤⇤ 2.270⇤⇤⇤ 1.287⇤⇤⇤ 1.625⇤⇤⇤
(0.110) (0.097) (0.189) (0.256) (0.169) (0.084) (0.098)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full OSEBX Not OSEBX MCAP 1 MCAP 2 MCAP 3 Passive
Observations 1,882 735 979 576 633 673 1,038
Adjusted R2 0.267 0.291 0.198 0.044 0.149 0.266 0.301
F Statistic 225.705⇤⇤⇤ 103.090⇤⇤⇤ 106.549⇤⇤⇤ 42.400⇤⇤⇤ 68.708⇤⇤⇤ 87.624⇤⇤⇤ 148.499⇤⇤⇤
(df = 4; 1662) (df = 4; 623) (df = 4; 794) (df = 4; 432) (df = 4; 468) (df = 4; 565) (df = 4; 890)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
A3 DiD: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 83
A3 DiD: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Table A3.1: Descriptive Statistics for DiD Sample
This table provides the number of observations, means, standard deviations and
distributions for the sample used in the causal analysis. The sample consists of pooled
cross-sections in the 2002-2019 sample period. Illiq is the annual average of daily absolute
returns divided by turnover in mNOK. Spread is the annual average of the monthly
average spread based on log close, high and low prices. CAV is the sum of daily
volume over a period of one month before an earnings announcement, excluding the
announcement day, divided by normal volume. DM is the cumulative return of the month
before the announcement, excluding the announcement day, divided by the cumulative
return of the same month including the announcement day. QVS is defined as the
squared return on the announcement day, divided by the sum of squared returns for
the full quarter. Synch is the log-transformed R2 from a market model where stock
returns are explained by market and sector returns. OSEBX Inclusion is a dummy
variable indicating whether or not a stock is in the treatment group. Active Ownership
is defined as the sum of shares held by active funds, divided by shares outstanding. Log
MCAP is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. Volatility is the annualised
standard deviation of returns, while Volume is the average daily shares traded scaled
by shares outstanding. Beta is the covariance of returns between a stock and OSEBX,
divided by the variance of OSEBX. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the annual sum of the
squared differences between daily returns of a stock and OSEBX. All change variables
are calculated as the two-year average after the OSEBX inclusion date, less the two-year
average before, and are winsorised at the 1% level.  Synch is winsorised at the 5%
level. The quarter of index inclusion and the subsequent quarter are excluded from
the sample. The (%) indicates that the variable is expressed in percentage points.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. p25 Median p75 Max.
Dependent Variables
  Illiq (%) 198 -0.07 1.35 -4.27 -0.24 -0.02 0.17 5.91
  Spread (%) 185 -1.23 0.53 -3.14 -1.45 -1.08 -0.86 -0.55
  CAV 120 -0.32 7.18 -20.17 -4.35 -0.71 4.48 15.83
  DM 120 -0.00 0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.19
  QVS (%) 120 1.69 4.98 -9.74 -1.69 1.52 4.74 14.03
  Synch 197 0.26 1.24 -2.34 -0.52 0.19 1.15 2.49
DiD Variable
OSEBX Inclusion 198 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Control Variables
  Active Ownership (%) 198 2.82 4.05 -4.93 0.15 1.67 3.86 22.82
  Log MCAP 198 0.28 0.77 -1.83 -0.11 0.28 0.69 2.65
  Volatility (%) 198 -0.65 24.54 -60.15 -15.21 -2.41 13.09 63.07
  Volume (%) 198 -0.01 0.37 -1.18 -0.08 0.00 0.08 1.68
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 198 -0.43 1.77 -5.09 -1.41 -0.22 0.65 3.67














Table A3.2: Pearson’s Correlation for DiD Sample
This table provides Pearson’s correlations for the sample used in the causal analysis. The sample consists of pooled cross-sections
in the 2002-2019 sample period. Illiq is the annual average of daily absolute returns divided by turnover in mNOK. Spread is the
annual average of the monthly average spread based on log close, high and low prices. CAV is the sum of daily volume over a period
of one month before an earnings announcement, excluding the announcement day, divided by normal volume. DM is the cumulative
return of the month before the announcement, excluding the announcement day, divided by the cumulative return of the same month
including the announcement day. QVS is defined as the squared return on the announcement day, divided by the sum of squared
returns for the full quarter. Synch is the log-transformed R2 from a market model where stock returns are explained by market and
sector returns. OSEBX Inclusion (OSEBX inc.) is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a stock is in the treatment group.
Active Ownership (AO) is defined as the sum of shares held by active funds, divided by shares outstanding. Log MCAP is the natural
logarithm of market capitalisation. Volatility is the annualised standard deviation of returns, while Volume is the average daily shares
traded scaled by shares outstanding. Beta is the covariance of returns between a stock and OSEBX, divided by the variance of OSEBX.
Idiosyncratic Volatility (IdVol) is the annual sum of the squared differences between daily returns of a stock and OSEBX. All change
variables are calculated as the two-year average after the OSEBX inclusion date, less the two-year average before, and are winsorised
at the 1% level.  Synch is winsorised at the 5% level. The quarter of index inclusion and the subsequent quarter are excluded from the sample.
  Illiq   Spread   CAV   DM   QVS   Synch OSEBX inc.   AO   Log MCAP   Volume   Volatility   IdVol   Beta
  Illiq 1.00
  Spread 0.06 1.00
  CAV -0.10 0.02 1.00
  DM 0.08 -0.28 -0.13 1.00
  QVS -0.12 0.07 -0.14 -0.47 1.00
  Synch -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 1.00
OSEBX inc. 0.02 -0.06 -0.15 0.15 0.04 0.27 1.00
  AO -0.26 0.09 0.06 -0.16 0.28 0.02 -0.04 1.00
  Log MCAP -0.35 -0.38 -0.04 0.16 0.02 0.49 0.21 0.02 1.00
  Volume -0.22 0.29 0.08 -0.17 -0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 1.00
  Volatility 0.24 0.50 0.09 -0.41 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.08 -0.53 0.24 1.00
  IdVol 0.06 0.26 0.35 -0.14 0.00 -0.18 -0.20 0.05 -0.26 0.08 0.20 1.00







A4 Variance Inflation Factors
Table A4.1: Variance Inflation Factors
This table provides the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the relationships documented in the paper. All dependent variables are present
in the table, with the VIFs from the models in which they are included.
Correlational Models DiD Models
  Illiq   Spread   CAV   DM   QVS   Synch   Illiq   Spread   CAV   DM   QVS   Synch
  Passive Ownership (%) 1.20 1.20 1.25 1.25 1.29 1.20
  Active Ownership (%) 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.35 1.47 1.33 1.43 1.38 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.36
  Log MCAP 1.56 1.56 1.59 1.59 1.76 1.56 1.87 1.91 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.25
  Volume (%) 1.24 1.24 1.19 1.25
  Volatility (%) 1.42 1.42 1.76 1.86
  Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.37 1.37 1.34 1.34 1.44 1.26 1.32 1.29 1.29 1.29
  Beta 1.14 1.14 1.17 1.15 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.29
DiD 1.25 1.25 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.21
Stock Dummies 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01
Year Dummies 1.08 1.08 1.07
Year-Quarter Dummies 1.03 1.03 1.03
Sector Dummies 1.12 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.11
Month of Index Inclusion Dummies 1.12 1.12 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.10
Note: The VIF’s are calculated as the square of GV IF 1/(2⇤Df), where Df is the number of coefficients in the model. This form of the
Generalised Variance Inflation Factor (GVIF) reduces the GVIF to a linear measure which is proportional to the inflation caused by
multicollinearity in the coefficient’s confidence interval (Fox and Monette, 1992). Thus, the general rule of thumb of critical VIF levels
(>5) can be applied.
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Table A5.1: Pairwise Correlation and Passive Ownership
The regressions in this table depict the relationship between changes in equally-
weighted pairwise correlation and changes in passive ownership. The sample
consists of 205 stocks and 2,070 stock-year observations in the period from 2001
to 2020. Models (2) and (4) include control variables and fixed effects for stock
and year, while models (1) and (3) include no such elements. Standard errors
clustered by stock and robust to heteroscedasticity are displayed in parentheses.
The dependent variable is multiplied by 100 and calculated as the change in the




  Passive Ownership (%) 0.536⇤⇤⇤ 0.220⇤⇤⇤
(0.186) (0.066)
  Active Ownership (%)  0.008
(0.034)
  Log MCAP 0.176
(0.201)




Stock FE No Yes
Year FE No Yes
Observations 2,070 2,070
Adjusted R2  0.104 0.321
F Statistic 9.489⇤⇤⇤ (df = 1; 1864) 240.992⇤⇤⇤ (df = 5; 1841)
Note:
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Figure A6.1: Annualised Monthly Volatility Distribution
This chart illustrates the 3-month rolling annualised monthly volatility. The volatility
is segmented into mutually exclusive components: firm-specific, sector-specific and
market-specific volatility, in line with Campbell et al. (2001). Market-specific volatility
is calculated using the standard deviation of the MCap-weighted returns of the total
market. Sector-specific volatility is defined as the annualised root of the sum of residuals
in a market model regressing MCap-weighted sector returns on market returns, which
is then weighted by the MCap of each sector. Finally, firm-specific volatility utilises a
similar approach, regressing firm returns on the weighted sector returns. The annualised
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Figure A7.1: Synchronicity and R2
This chart illustrates the relationship between a one percentage point increase in passive
ownership and the change in the adjusted R2 derived from the market model, for different
levels of Synch. The x-axis corresponds to different Synch levels and the solid lines represent
the change in R2 from the coefficiencts of   Passive Ownership from two different regression
models. The dotted lines mark the sample mean of the level of Synch for the full sample
and for the top tercile based on market capitalisation, and the corresponding change in R2.
















Sample: Full Sample MCAP Tercile 3
  Passive Ownership: 0.039
  Passive Ownership: 0.014
